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What You Will
Leonard Diepeveen, an English major
suffering from neurotic hubris, presents
these few thoughts on his favorite department-with a little help from an
unnamed seminarian who has infiltrated
the department as a Latin tutor.

•

. Thy Naiad airs have prought me
home
To the glory that was Greece,
. And the grandeur that was Rome.
- Edgar Allen Poe
Beginning a rather spirited
introduction to and defense of Calvin's
classical languages department, I am
quite aware that its professors have no.
idea that they should be introduced or
defended. Quite understandable: the
trauma of leaving the womb-like security
· of dusky offices and murky disciplines to
writhe under the blinding light of public
scrutiny would cause even the most stable
personalities some angst. However, the
classics department, perched ironically
above the audi_o-visual department, has
remained isolationist too long. So for its
own good, someone must initiate this
group of scholar-hermits into the larger
Calvin community.
Of course, to conduct such an initiation · demands a person of the highest
sensitivity and tenderness. I am such a
person. And my qualifications are
impeccable: having begun at the bottom
of the ladder with Latin 101, I have
kicked and clawed my way through four
semesters of Latin, driven by a perverse
and fanatical desire not to be beaten into
submission by a dead language.
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Throughout this prolonged struggle I
have had time to notice many quirks that
these professors communally cultivate.
First; Calvin's classics professors selfconsciously and continually rise above
everything. Since every modern vice or
virtue is only a pale reincarnation from
the works and days of either the Greeks,
the Romans, or the Medievals, there cannot possibly be anything new under the
sun. Calvin certainly offers no
exception-its insipidity automatically
disallows even the slightest new variation on even the most mundane vice or
virtue. So, cynically and collectively, the
department rises above Calvin's petty
squabbles. I cannot but help indulging in
the image of a tweed-coated classics professor borne skyward by multi-colored
balloons of ennui.
This and many other of the department's idiosyncracies gain a prominent
place in the classroom. For these professors do not merely teach, but rather,
like the treatises ,of their Medieval and
Roman heroes, they infuse (and sometimes replace) their lectures on grammatical structure with discourses on
modern medicine, church liturgy, ice
hockey, principles of biblical translation,
and basketball. While these asides
unfold, the student may laugh
delightedly, contemplatively frown (a
popular response with the pre-sem
crowd), or quietly agree; never, according to the implicit rules, may he be so undignified as to openly disagree. The
"implicit rules" enforce the willing suspension of disbelief: the professor is
Puck, the students are the rude
mechanicals, and the whole class is conducted in a dreamlike state.
But, I must shake off this idyllic

torpor: Thus far I have been very positive, even perhaps slightly tender in my
evaluation; however, complete
knowledge of another person can only
come through recognition and understanding of his faults. With this psychological truism in hand, I have one minute
criticism to offer. A six-shelf library
stands complacently in the main office of
the department. To the casual observer
this library seems innocent enough, but
close and perceptive study unfailingly reveals that this collection of books is not
mere lifeless matter: it is unmistakably
animate-and intolerably smug. It seems
to chant over and over again, "We have
knowledge. You are a twit." ·The five
identical volumes of selections from
Lactantiu·s are most unmistakably filled
with this animus. Indeed, I have been put
in my place as a ninety-pound intellectual
weakling innumerable times by these
books, though, so far I · have very
maturely resisted the ·impulse to kick
sand at their bindings.
·
But wait, my intention was to defendto praise the department-not to bury it.
Since by now the classics department
probably regards being defended by me
much as Ronald Reagan would welcome
to his rallies supporters waving signs
announcing "Homosexuals for Reagan,"
I will keep my defense brief. All of the
idiosyncracies of the department not only
lose their stigma, but actually gain a
certain poignancy with the added
consideration of one previously
unexamined fact. In its classes, this
department has by far the highest proportion of pre-sems. The psychological
strain of confronting each morning a sea
of polyester and snappy briefcases must
be tremendous. Rather than censuring

those professors for their oddities, we
ought to praise them for bearing up so
well. So, if you see one of them groping
his way to his office one morning, give
him a deferential pat on ·the back and
murmur "requiescas in pace." He will
understand.

Br.ea·kfast and Beyond
Some people daydream; some people
quit school and travel through Europe;
every Saturday night I work the graveyard shift at Breakfast Just Breakfast, ·
and that is my escape.
As the everyday world sleeps, I drift
through the strata of Eastown as a nonentity, freed from self and the responsibilities of everyday life. A waitress
doesn't exist; if for some odd reason a
customer wants to talk, civility is required, but one's true self- is never revealed.
As the night ebbs and becomes dawn, I
watch different groups . of Eastown
dwellers rise and claim the ..territory.
From eleven to twelve thirty, Eastown, as
represented at Just B.reakfast, is controlled by high school, Aquinas, and
Calvin kids, usually in couples. These
kids hardly participate in Eastown life.
They walk through on mirrors, leaving
only faint · reflections of respectability
behind. As a Calvin student, I know
many of these people, but as a waitress, I
am ·not a friend; I am a coffee machine.
By one o'clock the young blue collar
workers have ·stormed into Just
Breakfast. The culmination of their takeover is Bar Rush. After . unwinding at
Faces, The Intersection, The White
Rabbit, or The Eastown Saloon, silly,
hysterically loud, they tumble into the
restaurant. Groups of women laugh at
their opposite numbers. People wander
through the restaurant, following up
transient connections made earlier in the
bar. Taking orders is next to impossible;
comprhension slackens markedly
after drinking all .night. Last. Saturday,
during the busiest time of night, I

watched the answer slowly fade from the
eye of a customer after a silence while we
gazed into each other's eyes-I trying to
find how he wanted his eggs, and he
trying to rediscover the question. After
endless 9ups of coffee, omelettes, and
hashbrowns with cheese and onion, quiet
falls momentarily . .
An hour later
after the last noisy
party wanders away-,
. -,, -,?
the bowling crowd
descends.
League
bowling ends at four
and a blue-shirted
group_ of forty to
sixty-year olds
settles in to wind
down and disc-µss
the high points and
low scores of their
game. The majority
of the bowlers are
ghetto blacl,cs; they
take the attitude
that a waitress, . a
woman, exists only
to take orders and
needs no "please"
and "thank you" for
a cup of coffee. They,
set a mood which
gains in intensity as
the younger ghetto blacks take over.
These folks delight in issuing needles~
commands. "I need water" is a common
request, although full glasses will be left
on the table when they leave. "This ham's
not done" is another complaintalthough it is precooked and steaming. In
strange contrast to these younger ghetto
dwellers are the pimps and their whores.
As working women, the whores have a
common sympathy with waitress~s. They
usually leave good tips, and I can
sympathize with their conversation: not
what they say, but their feelings. As I
listen, bussing a table, I know exactly
what is meant when a stunningly dressed
woman complains. "It's just slam, barn,.
th_a nk you ma'am. There's . just no
consideration any more. No one cares

about me. Slam, barn, thank you ·
ma'am." I, with two hours left to work,
watch them, their work over; disperse
into the night.
With any luck, the restaurant is empty
or next to empty-just a few two-pertable talkers left. Finally, after filling the
sugars, jellies, and cream, I sit dowh with

::

-~ ... :~· · · ~-··•.'-':·•

a cup of coffee.
The Sunday morning singles come in
for a quiet paper-reading breakfast I
know these people by their orders which
never change. Without fail the last three
tables before I go off work are l) French ·
toast and coffee, 2) two hot, hot, hot
raspberry danishes and coffee, and a
father/ son combo who, after delivering
the morning press, come in for 3) coffee,
hot chocolate and panca.kes. The only
sound in the restaurant is the ·r adio softly
playing church music.
By seven, Yvonne has arrived with hair
wet from her wake-up shower. We
murmur sleepy good mornings, and I
drive home through the early morning
dawn to my bed and sleep as the day
brightens.
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William Brashier:
A Lapsed Calvinist's Impressions
Patricia Rozema
Leaning back, with his hands clasped behind his head and his
cowboy boots on his desk, William Brashier presents himself as
the most regular of guys. This gregarious, almost boyish, writer
can entertain at length wit,h an anecdote or opinion on just
about anything. In his writing room on the third floor of his
house ("as close to a garret as I've had") amidst hundreds of
books and stacked back copies of Esquire, Playboy, and
Chicago Magazine, Brashier shows me pictures of his 16month-old boy, Bobby. "I gave my kid a name he can live with,
I'll tell ya. None of this trendy Branden or Jason crap."
William Brashier, (somehow "Bill'' seems more appropriate),
his wife Cindy, a systems analyst at IBM, and Bobby reside in a
grand old pillared. house in a predominantly working class
neighborhood in Chicago. Were he to live according to his
means, he says, "I'd live on Lakeshore Drive and you would
have been greeted at the door by my butler and some other
dignified gent would have parked your car for you." But none of
that for this successful author, or at least not much of it. The
value of hard work, frugality, and a healthy dose of guilt are
consistent themes. in his conversation.
Born and raised in Grand Rapids, this Christian Reformed
young man went directly from Westside Christian High to, you
guessed it, Calvin College. He spent three years at Calvin which
was, he says, "one year too many." After he "pretty well got
thrown out," he went to the University of Michigan, then to the
University of low~, worked as a newspaper reporter for a while
until he hit the lottery with his first book.
During his stint at this venerable Calvinist institution
between 1965 and 1968, Brashier played baseball and basketball, wrote for Chimes. and was sports editor during the
Schrader-Oppewal era. "We spent an entire year being royal
pains in the ass-it was expected of us," he says. He can remembe_r Schrader telling him (imitating a lisp), "You know
Brashier. .. if you could just put down that basketball you might
do something worthwhile."
If seven books published in seven years are any measure,
Schrader was right. In 1972, Harper and Row bought his first
novel, The Bingo Long Travelling All Stars and Motor Kings,
which he wrote on Wednesday nights and Saturdays while he
was a peon reporter for Learner newspapers. "I can remember
dancing on the tables," he says, pointing proudly to the framed
notification telegram from Harper and Row on the wall beside
his desk. This first book deals with the trials and triumphs of a
flamboyant black baseball team galavanting around the United
States between the two world wars. Ironically, he notes, the

Patricia Rozema is a senior majoring in philosophy and English
with a minor in journalism. This ex-Chimes editor was in
Chicago on a broadcast journalism internship last semester.

6

novel was bought the day Jackie Robinson died in October of
1972.
Then it just snowballed. Book of the Month Club bought
it. Producers were calling me from Ho ll ywood while the
book was still in manuscript/arm. The ~ovies bought it.
It was sold to paperback-two different editions. The
reviews came out and they were excellent. I find out
they're getting Richard Pryor to play Bingo. People were
asking me to speak all over the place. It was like the
American Dream. It was great.
Although portraying human truths and subtle social
comment through sports storie~ seems to be his favorite mode,
Brashier has also branched out into writing about everything
from the black middle class, to the Mafia (The Don: The Life
and Death of Sam Giancana, 1977) to the graphic details of a
Chicago wino's sordid life (City Dogs, 1976). He free lances
regularly for, among others, The Chicago Tribune Sunda v
Magazine, Esquire, The New York Times Magazine, and
Newsweek. In his latest book, to be published next summer
titled A Chosen Prey, he takes a look over his shou lder at his
own ethnic/ religious roots. Brashier asserts he is by no means
consumed with disdain for the Dutch CRC types but his new
book promises to present a less than flattering picture of "t hose
Bible thumpers."
Brashier: It's set in South Haven, Michigan, or actually, a
fictional town based on South Haven. I've set the summer
Jewish tourists up against the Dutch townsfolk and farmers.
There .are lots of these Jewish summer resorts along Lake
Michigan. I've tried to show the radical differences between the
two cultures. The Jewish are there to enjoy themselves, breathe
clean air and resuscitate themselves. The farmers are there, just
baffled at how people could possibly have much fun lying
around on the beach and reading when there's obviously so
much work to be done. At the core of the book I've put the
murder of several Jewish boys-the book deals with the
mystery surrounding all of that, the suspicion cast both ways.
The Dutch ministers are stomping up to their pulpits saying that
the Jews deserve this sort of thing because it says in Scripture
that they are the enemies of Christ.
Rozema: Sounds a little like a caricature.
Brashier: Well, anything seems like caricature when you're
talking about the excesses of religion.
Ro zema: I gather, then, that you think Grand Rapids and
Christian Reformdom in general manifest the excess of religion?
Brashier: I think all Bible thumpers do. You see, ca ricatures
are based on reality. If I were to give an exact representation of
some of these religious types, I'd be laughed out of the litera ry
world . They a re so foolish, they can't help but seem like cari-

catures.
Rozema: How would you describe the CRC Dutch to someone
who had never heard of them?
Brashier: Two ways. I'd do -my five favorite Dutch· names:
Pukema, Slaapsema, Vlaardingerbrooke, Schlicktenhorse and
Hoogerheid . See, you have to say them really fast like Christian school teachers would for role ·call without blinking an
eyelash.
The other way is to describe life in a Dutch CRC household. I
didn't grow up in a particularly repressive household, we were ·
just your average Dutch-Grand Rapids family.
Rozema: Twice-a-S unda y-every-S unda y-types?
. Bra~hler: No, really we were quite liberal [ whispering] we often
didn't even go at night. But you know, I tell people about all the
church-related activities: Sunday school, catechism, Cadets,
Calvinettes, Young People's Group, Bible studies. That usually
awes people. We thought all this was normal.
Rozema: Do you th-ink you've suffered for having been raised in
this community and going to Calvin College?
Brashier: Oh no. Schrader does, he thinks he's suffered
terribly. We didn't suffer, hell, we didn't know anything else.
The only thing we suffered from (which wasn't painful a.tall, in
fact, it was quite comfortable) was myopia. We had no idea
what the whole fascinating world out there was doing. You see,
Calvin severely insulates you, it stifles you, it dampens your
creativity and limits your horizons. When I wenuo the U. of M.
after Calvin, I felt like a five-year-old in a candy store. Suddenly
there was so much to do, so many interesting people to meet
that I didn't know where to start. That's where I first met Jewish
people for instance. Calvin was a good school for the basics; it
had an excellent liberal arts program, especially in philosophy,
history and English. But when somebody goes to Calvin they
automatically only consider a very small number of very
narrow, conventional options. They take themselves so
seriously. I'm glad I didn't waste any more time there. Calvin
doesn't acknowledge how fascinating and multicolored the rest
of society really is. But you go there, what do you think?
Rozema: Well, I think you can still get a good education therethere are some awful fine scholars at Calvin. But, unfortunately,
it's probably become even more unconcerned with what's going
on around it. Especially the students-they figure they've
already got the most complete truth in their pockets, so why
bother taking anyone else's experience and thought seriously.
Brashier: Ya, it's too bad, but it's bound to happen given the
nature of the place.
Rozema: You mean as an 1nstitution devoted solely to one point
of view?
Bras.hler: Yes.
At this point we take a break to get cup of coffee and he
shows me around his very elegant but understated house
decorated largely with antiques and shades of brown ("Cindy
has a weakness for brown," he says:) He is careful to point out
that they have done most of the refinishing and painting themselves. "We could have had it done, but it wouldn't be the same."
In Bobby's room he shows me the brass crib and defends himself
from any possible accusation of extravagance by explaining
that it will become ·an heirloom.
Sensing some sort of, well, complicated attitude towards
money and luxury, I ask, "So, how do you like living in all this
luxury and wealth and everything?" To listen to his reaction,
you'd think I had accused him of stealing it all from welfare
families. With elaborate detail he explains how hardworking
and frugal he and Cindy are and how they "never just throw
away leftover meat or anything." ~nowing full well that I was
pushing it, I ask, "So you d_o n't think you have sold out, eh?"'
His defensiveness becomes even more marked. He tells of his

postman and taxi-driver neighbors with whom he talks about
the weather and the gardinias. "We're actually very decent,
modest folk and we really do live far below our means." Later he
admits, with his disarming honesty and endearing vulnerability,
'.'I'm really quite sensitive and defensive about that, you know."
I tell him I sense that, apologize for sounding at all accusatory
and admit that I do admire his unpretentiousness. Back in his
office we continue.
·
Rozema: How does your Calvin education and Calvinist
heritage affect you and your writing now?
Brashier: Nothing dramatic reallx because I never suffered
from it. Actually I find it all rather amusing. The only thing it
has done is make me a very moral person, an ethical person. I
mean, I don't want to injure anyone or cheat in any way. I have a
strong aversion to greed, maliciousness and deception. For

a
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instance, I don't believe you should cheat on your income tax or
collect unemployment when you've really quit. I have a strong
sense of right and wrong.
Another thing is the discipline. I always tell people the reason
I'm a successful writer is because I have a great amount of guilt.
Guilt is important for a writer
because you have to live with
yourself and can't just screw
off. Guilt can be a very positive
thing.
Rozema: In a Chicago Tribune
Magazine article, you say that
every morning you look in the
mirror and say something like,
"You miserable worm, you
better justify your existence
today."
Brashier: Oh, you read that, did
you? Well, I really believe that.
A freelance writer needs guilt
because you have to be a selfstarter. It is so easy just to mess
around all day, playing with the
cats, reading books or masturbating - there is no one to tell
you to get down to work. But
I've written seven books in
seven years, and I attribute
much of my productiveness to
guilt. When I was a reporter
some of my colleagues said they
felt really good after a day of
just goofing off because it
meant they got by on their
intelligence and just by being
basically a good person. And
I'd say well, you aren't a go9d
person - nobody is.
Rozema: Cafl I safely assume
from what you've said that you
wouldn't classify yourself as a
religious person?
Brashier: Not at all. I don't even
think about it much. I had all
sorts of religious traumas and crises in college. Then I started
going to Fountain Street Church and found Duncan Littlefair a
lot more relevant and satisfying than ariybody I'd heard till
then . When I went to U. of M., I left it all behind and it's never
haunted me, it's never bothered me. Mind you, ten years ago I
was very scornful of it, as a reaction-a/a Schrader. But now I
just see religion as something some people need. I don't neeiit. I
won't raise my kid in a religious way, although I will raise him in
a very moral way. He's not baptized, we don't go to church,
don't argue about it or even talk about it. I'm just not interested.
When you folks from Chimes called last year for money for
your proposed I0th Anniversary issue of the Bananer [the
attempt was aborted], I didn't want to support a magazine
ridiculing Calvin for the same reason I don't give money to
Calvin itself: I'm completely disinterested. I don't believe in the
value of religious institutions. I don't like religious motivations.
The Moral Majority is repugnant to me-I loathe those people.
One of the themes of my new novel is the ability of people to use
religion for their own self-interest and to hurt others.
Rozema: I'm sure you get a lot of young writers asking for
advice. What do you tell them, culivate some guilt?
Brashier: Of course not. But you have to do your homework, if
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Brashier: Of course not. But you have to do your homework; if
you want to be a writer, write. One of the problems with
America is that opportunity seems to be so instant. So many
people think all you need is a break to be a successful writer.
People don't slave away anymore, honing their skills until
they're ready. You have to learn
how to do what you do well
first. ,
Rozema: But so many people
do it well.
Brashier: It seems that way
when you are your age. When
you're my age [all of 33], it
seems that nobody does it well.
You'd be amazed at the incom- ·
petence, you'd be amazed at the
number of people who fake it,
the lazy bullshit _a rtists . I'm
amazed at the number of people when people look at my output arid are awed-just slackjawed. I'm not that prolific. I
simply work 8:30 to 5 everyday.
Some of it is raw talent, but, to
a great extent, talent is
developed. If you've got it and
you've worked at it, it'll show.
Rozema: Talent will out.
Brashier: Exactly. The best
thing you could do if you want
to write is to become a
Renaissance
person-you've
go.t to know philosphy, economics, history, you have to
read . the classics. Do your
homework. You've got to
sweat.
Rozema: Did you sweat?
Brashier: You bet I did. When I
worked as a reporter in Chicago
I ran around from police stations, to court rooms, to city
council rooms, to fires, to
people's living rooms with my
notebook and raced back to the typewriter and wrote up stories
as fast as I could, It was great. It was some of the best writing
training I ever got. Shit, I was a nobody, a little punk kid just
out of college. It was great; it was tough; but it was great. And
when I was in college, I wrote short stories and other articles
and sent them out all over the place. Most of them were returned. Then I thought everybody was great and that I only had
a very slim chance of making it.
Rozema: Did you ever win any awards for your writing in
college?
Brashier: Yes, I won the top Hopward Award for short stories
from the University of Michigan. In 1968-69, it was worth
$1,000. I just went out of my mind. It's still a very prestigious
award. Arthur Miller and X .J. Kennedy have also received it.
Peter DeVries was the keynote speaker at the awards evening.
Later that night, John Alderidge told me to "savor the money."
He said, "because it's the most you'll ever make writing." That
convinced me right then and there that being a writer would
either be one hell of a lot of work or probably just a pipedream.
But a lot of hard work, persistence, mixed with some talent and
a little intelligence is the key. But I was lucky because I struck it
rich with my first book; it gave me a financial base.

Rozema: A break, huh, an instant opportunity?
Brashier: Ha, sort of, I guess. But when you make it so big on

your first book it's pretty scary.
·
Rozema: Too much too fast?
Brashier: Ya, the whole situation was incredible. You say to
yourself: what can you do to top this? That's where the old
Calvinist guilt worked very nicely because I told myself if anything good happens, it must be a fluke. I had to keep writing. I
had to continually remind myself that it might never happen
again.
·
Rozema: I suppose you had set yourself a standard that you had
· to continually measure up to.
Brashier: A standard of writing but not a standard of achievement. You can't say how well something is going to go over. The
publishing industry is too fickle for that. A standard of writing
is all I can strive for.
Rozema: How did you like the movie rendition of Bingo Long?
Brashier: Oh, I was pleasantly surprised. I had decided to leave
it completely alone right from the start. I'd heard too many
stories of authors being emotionally devastated by trying to
father the movie of their books. Hollywood would make the
movie it wanted to regardless of my advice. I figured they could
make Citizen Kane in blackface or Shaft Plays Third Base or
something in between. There was some good evocation of the
period and my intentions behind the book. But some of it .was
downright schlocky corn.
Rozema: What about writing styles? Do you think there are
any objective standards for a good novel, for instance?
Brashier: Readability. There aren't really any objective
standards for good writing-I just know it when I read it. I _d o
think, however, that you should be true to your personality,
· true to your own voice. What bothe,rs me about most writers, .
especially young writers, is that when they get behind a typewriter, they suddenly get vety solemn and impressed with themselves. (This happens to certain movie directors we know too.)
Rozema: Why do you write?
Brashier: People buy it. That sounds a little crass, I know, but I
can make a decent living at it and it gives me a lot of pleasure.
I've been writing since I was eight years old.
Rozema: So you always knew?
Brashier: No, you never know. I don't know even today. I've
always felt challenged by writing as a separate thought
process-as you write you create and develop things in your
mind that you never knew were there. If I'm honest, I guess
there is a certain amount of ego involved too.
Rozema: Does it give you a sense of immortality?
Brashier: Oh no, not that, I don't dare to· think about that.
That's way beyond me.
Rozema: Earlier you mentioned Schrader; were you a friend of
his?

Brashier: Well, no one is really a friend of Schrader's. We

worked on the paper together. He was incredibly funny; he was
great to laugh with, but the next thing you knew he was bashing
your teeth in. We still get along alright, but he takes himself so
seriously now; I mean he got a nose job, the whole bit.
Rozema: You've_got to be kidding. I'd demand a refund if I were
him.
Brashier: No, I'm pretty sure. I_knew that schnoz anywhere, it
covered 3/4 of his face. Here, look in this old Prism (he pulls out
a copy). Look at the schlabonzo. (He leafs through the yearbook gleefully showing me pictures of Schrader and himself.)
Rozema: When you were talking to a friend of mine you said
you thought Hardcore was trite. Do you still think so? ·
Brashier: I think he makes awful movies. I thought Hardcore ·
was a horrible movie. I didn't enjoy it, I don't think anybody
did. I was embarrassed by HardCore.
Rozema: Embarrassed?
Brashier: I mean embarrassed for him. He is so derivative-he
steals from other writers all the time. Like he's always ·stealing
from this Robert Persone guy.
Rozema: So you don't think Hardcore portrayed Grand Rapids
accurately?
Brashier: No. Somebody said it portrayed Grand Rapids in the
l 930's. I think that's true. It did capture the essence of the Dutch
mentality but it was too easy. In that one scene though, where
Jake VanDorn explains the T.U.L.I.P. doctrine to the hooker
and she's looking at him like he's from outer space-that was
great. He captured the eccentricity of the religion in a delightful,
artful, rarefied way. If he could have spread that sort of thing ··
throughout the whole movie he would have had a real gem on
his hands.
Rozema: But he didn't.
Brashier: No, he just got violent and nasty and stupid and tried
to bring in snuff movies and that stupid rampage through
Hollywood and all that lurid sex. It was· really juvenile.
Rozema: I thought he seemed to try to capitalize on what he
really wanted to condemn. It smacked of a morbid curiosity.
· Brashier: Exactly. His biggest problem is that he takes himself
too seriously. That's the downfall of any artist.
We shoot the breeze for as long as that good old Calvinist
guilt would allow, and finally e both return to our respective
jobs. As I drive away, I'm amazed at how comfortable a writer
of his stature and reputation could make me feel. It is this
casual,. lighthearted style that makes his writing as comfortable
and unlabored as it is.
As to his amused. ambivalent attitude towards his Calvinist
background, it's obvious even fame andfortune have1ft washed
away its indelible impression on him. But for all his talk of guih,
frugality, and hard work, what came through most clearly was
the serious repercussions of taking oneself too seriously. Now,
that seems worth taking seriously.
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Words and Works:
Phil Schreur

Phil Schreur graduated from Calvin
College in 1980 with a
degree in music. Next
year he plans to study
music history in
graduate school and
also to continue in
composition.

I started composing about two or three years ago. I had
wanted to compose for a long time, but I was very hesitant
about putting anything down on paper. After I finished my
introductory music classes, I took an orchestration class with
Dr. Worst so that I would know how to write for various instruments. After that I started composing and I enjoy it! It's lots of
fun.
·
The one thing which is, I think, most important in writing
music today, is that you write music which is playable and that
people like to play. A lot of modern compositions, especially
compositions written at universities, are very experimental and
tremendously difficult to play. They get played once, and after
that you never hear them again. This is because they try new
techniques and a lot of those techniques are so difficult to play
that the common musician won't even attempt them. A piece
could be good and well-constructed, but unplayable. It just
doesn't seem right to write music which is so difficult to play.
Most of the pieces I write, I write with collegium people in
mind, because I know what they can play and what they can't.
(There's a lot of excellent music for collegium to play, but not a
lot of new music.) The instruments and tone colors are fresh, at
least to the twentieth century, and beautiful. There are so many
possible ways to use them, if you just try. It's handy to have a
group to play my pieces. It's easier to get five people from colle- •
gium to try my pieces than it is to get the orchestra.
When somebody asks me to write a piece, I try to take into
consideration those people and how they will be using the piece.
This gives me all kinds of limiting factors. Usually, when I write
a piece, the only limiting factor is the people I'm writing it for
rathern than the audience. I write pieces the performers will like
. to play-that are not too complex-so people of medium
technique can play them, enjoy them, and not have to work for
hours and hours in order to do it. Aaron Copland used to have a
style that was really-you would think sounded-avant garde,
and he changed; I don't know why exactly. He started writing
pieces like Rodeo, Billy the Kid, and Appalachian Spring in a
simplified style. It's still very good music and nice to listen to,
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but it's not as hard to play. So there doesn't seem to be any
reason why you can't write music that's good and easy to playor, not hard, I should say.
The way I compose changes with every piece. for some pieces
I'll get an i~ea beforehand, usually from listening to music
that moves me, either at a concert or on the stereo. So I get some
pre-set ideas of what I want to do before I start. And then again,
there are pieces that people ask me to write. In this case, I
usually don't have pre-set ideas other than the conditions given
me: like how many people are going to play and on what instruments. Then I'll usually just start playing at the piano and play
around until I fi nd a few phrases that I like, a couple of ideas,
and I'll go from there. Another way I compose, is by getting a
feel for a certain sound, a certain color of instruments-just a
certain combina tion that I like. Then I'll just try to write a piece
for the sounds I've heard. Instead of writing a melodic piece, I
write a sound grouping. For example, the piece I'm writing
now-a lament on the death of Ockeghem for four sack buts,
three gambas, a counter tenor, and a corneto-is like a piece by
Charles Ives: The Unanswered Question. In it different groups
of instruments play by themselves in their own tempos. The
effect is three independent groups melting into one sound mass.
I like any kind of music. Sometimes I think I should be more
selective. But I just like anything that makes noise. I almost
always have the radio playing. Yet, itdoesn't have any stylistic
influence on my work. It doesn't really affect me. It doesn't fit in
with what I want to do.
I think the greatest composer of the twentieth century is
Stravinski, (He's my idol.) There's just something about his
music-it's always superbly crafted and filled with i.rresistable
rhythms. He composed many different kinds of pieces-only
one time-and then would move on to something else. His
music is full of life; I could sit and listen to it for hours. But I
don't write music like he does. That's just an idea of what I want
my music to be like-not necessarily his style, but keeping him
in mind.
Most of my pieces use techniques from the Renaissance:
techniques of writing pieces by individual melodic line (not so
much by harmony) and then putting them all together, and also
of using drones-which are another of my favorite things. So
really, the techniques I use, I pick up from historical styles. I
pick out what I like and then use that. I like Oriental music quite
a bit too. It has the same static, dronish sort of character with
very long sustained chords-especially the Gagu Ku music of
Japan. I like slow moving melodies quite a lot.
I don't know how to play a keybord instrument. I think that is
the biggest reason why I write the way I do. If you play the
piano, it's easy to write one melody line and then work out the
chords with your other fingers as you play, but, I've never been
able to do that. So I started writing in a Renaissance style. I
have to work each line out individually because I just can't play
them all at once-like the piece I'm working on now, a nine-part
chanson. I'm writing four parts at once and then I fit another
four parts onto that. Each section will be worked out by itself
and then it will be fitted together. Usually, I try to keep in mind

what has to be fitted in. I don't finish one section and have it
polished and ready and then try to put something else in it.
Rather, I'll start with a framework of about three parts and then .
finish the rest of the piece so that it all fits into the framework.
. I don't write in the major/ minor tonal system. What you
think of as classical or romantic music is written in major or
minor. But one can write .in a tonal system without writing in
major or minor. A certain tone, or groups of tones can be the
center of attraction toward which the others are drawn. For
example, Stravinski quite often wrote in a tonally oriented
system. He would write pieces with poles of attraction that work
as the tonic would, but it wasn't a major/minor system.
Similarly, the music I write is tonal and often modal. I use the
church modes, but with chords built on thirds, fourths, fifths,
and added tones. I use those s~ales because I'm writing.for old
instruments, which were built' with a diatonic system in mind.
When I write a piece I try to keep the piece logical and
consistent. For the most part, I enjoy composing as a mental

exercise. I first try to write a piece that sticks
to one historical style, just to make sure •I
know how to do it. After I get familia r with
the style·, I can use the techniques that I've
learned. I can then adapt them and use them
in a style that is my own.
Too many people are interested in being
avant garde. Only a small amount of people
are good at developing those techniques.
The idea has to be tamed. Nowadays, it is a
- fad to be avant garde. I don't like many
avant garde composers. I don't like what
John Cage-who for instance is a very good
experimenter-does with his ideas; for
example, his piece for a number of radiosplaying different volumes, stations, and at
different times. However, I think his idea of
using chance is good. I would like to use
some of his ·ideas but not his style. Furthermore, I dislike the idea of a composer having
absolute control, the opposite extreme of
random chance music. Often performers can
add a lot to my pieces when they play them,
things that I didn't even know were there
when I was writing them.
·
I'm very ignorant. Being here in ·orand
Rapids, I don't hear the latest avant garde or
experimental music. I've absolutely no idea
what is happening in New York or what ·
music is like there. But I think there is probably less of the rather wild experimentation
that was being done. Now is a time of taking
those techniques and working them into the
mainstream.
I must admit tha·t I like working alone.
But I think it would be nice if there were
more chances for composers to get their
works played. It's practically impossible to
get a piece played where people will hear it.
Usually, just the people who play the piece
will hear it. Here at Calvin, performance is
stre~sed more than composition because
most people are in music history or performance. It is only rarely that a person
comes to Calvin and says, "I want to
. compose." It's not stressed because there
aren't' enough people here who want to
compose.
Actually, I don't know whether composition is what I'll be doing with most of my
time in graduate school. I'm going to study music.history. What
I would like to do is study various periods of music history and
then use the things I've learned in class when I write my pieces.
· I've found that my pieces are often similar to the music history
course I happen to be in at the time. I'm just beginning to learn
about the various historical styles and my goal now is to study
and learn as many styles as I can and work those techniques into
~~~.
My goal for writing music is to write what Hindemith calls
Gebrauchsmusik. I want to write music for people to play. I am
not as interested in writing, for•instance, a string quartet in an
abstract sense: I want ·to · write mus.ic using techniques that
people can play and enjoy playing. I also want to keep. on
writing music for old instruments in a twentieth century style
for an old instrument consort at a ·college to play. I'm still
picking up new ideas with each new style I study: I really am in
the process of learning. What I write is very much written for the
people who play it; it should be a joy to play as well as to hear.
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Made in Germany: Screening
Last spring Volker Schlondorfrs The Tin Drum won the
Motion Picture Academy's Oscar for Best Foreign Film. The
first ever for a German production in a category long dominated by the likes of Bergman and Fellini, this award was no
isolated triumph . It registe red the arrival, with something like
tidal force, of European cinema's latest New Wave: the selfstyled New German Cinema (lunger Deutscher Film), a band of
young directors who within the past few years have established
West Germany as a center . of some of the West's most
interesting and provocative filmmaking.
Not since the golden· age of silent films, in fact, has the
German imagination been so visible on world screens. The leading directors are becoming celebrities; one or two enjoy something like cult status. Their success, to be sure, remains largely a ·
success d'estime. Audiences-German ones included-still find
much of their work curiously foreign. Indeed, the New German
Cinema seldom promises entertainment in the conventional
sense. "I don't throw bombs, I make films," one of its leading
figures, Rainer Werner Fassbinder, has enigmatically declared.

Whatever else they may intend, Fassbinder and his fellows seem
more concerned with provocation than ingratiation. Their
work is typically complex, often shocking, always rich in
introspective and often violent social criticism. When they do
laugh, their humor is not so much amusing as grotesque or
absurd. Recurrent themes include spiritual emptiness, alienation, and the pervasiveness of evil in personal and institutional
relations.
Germany's new cinema, in short, offers little sweetness and
light; the atmosphere is often heavy with night and fog. To some
it will seem a murky wilderness of celluloid Weltschmerz. Yet
the best of these films can be strangely revelatory, illuminating
aspects of life which are often obscured by prosperity and the
smug narcissism of so much present-day culture. If, as many
insist, cinema is the ultimate contemporary art form, then the
German contribution can hardly be ignored. For all their
puzzling and sometimes objectionable features, the disturbing,
often searingly intelligent films of the New Wave reflect a
desperate moral seriousness ·which, however much one may
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Highly Recommended
Werner Herzog: Aguirre, Wrath of God
( 1972)
Set in the sixteenth century and filmed
in the lush jungles of South America ,
A,?uirre opens with the perilous descent
of Spanish conquistadors down the steep
side of a moun tain . Struggling agains t
overwhelming forces of nature and lethal
Indian arrows , the cortege proceeds by
raft down the river in search of El
Dorado, mythical city of gold. Yet the
physical struggle only provides a backdrop fo r the figure of Aguirre , an officer
who, through an incredible assertion of
ego and will , establishes absolute control
over the group. Relying alternately on an
uncanny ability to mesmerize his followers and on the application of most brutal
coercion, Aguirre demands total loyalty

David Diephouse is a history professor at
Calvin. Mary Jane Lamse is a professor
of German at Calvin.
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long after the entire enterprise has become utterly hopeless. He knows no selfdoubt, no slackening of the will even
when, surrounded by his dead followers,
he must leave the raft to his sole survivors-the monkeys.
To a German viewer the power of
Aguirre is made many times more intense
through the unspoken but unavoidable
reexperiencing of Hitler. Especially
against this historical background
Herzog's film becomes a profound
exploration of the evil still so near the
surface in apparently civilized human
beings.
Werner Herzo g: Stroszek (1976/77)
Unlike most of Herzog's films,
Stroszek is set in the present. Bruno S.,
just released from prison , returns to his
shabby apa rtment in a working-class
section of Berlin. Soon thereafter, Bruno
and the prostitute Eva, intimidated by
two pimps, decide to leave Berlin;
together with an elderly neighbor they
emigrate to America. After a brief
euphoric moment on the platform of the
Empire State Building, the three set out

on their sobering journey over the highways of America to the midwestern town
of Railroad Flats. Long before Bruno's
child - like optimism wavers, the
American viewer senses the futility of
Bruno's faith in America as the land of
opportunity. The viewer sees through the
fast talk of the unscrupulous mobilehome salesman, the loquaciousness of
the tough bill collector, and the affability
of the truckers out to purchase a few
minutes of sex with the all-too..,willing
Eva. Stroszek can hit an American
viewer pretty hard-not with a single
blow but with steadily intensifying
shocks of recognition which build into a
powerful sense of sadness over the unfulfilled promise of the American dream.
Alf Brustellin, Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Alexander Kluge, Maximiliane
Mainka, Edgar Reitz, Katja Rupl/ Hans
Peter · Cloos, Volker Schlondorff/
Heinrich B~m, Bernhard S inkel:
Germany in Autumn ( 1977 /78)
During the summer and fall of 1977,
the Federal Republic of Germany was
traumatized by a bizarre round of ter-

the Best
David Diephouse
Mary Jane Lamse
fault its assumptions or conclusions, deserves at least the
attempt to understand it.
Rebels With a Cause
A large part of the New German Cinema still reflects its
origins as a protest movement. Most of its leading lights first
· came to prominence as enrages, rebelling against what they saw
as the oppressive commercialism and artificiality of most postwar German films. Indeed, for a generation after 1945, West
Germany scarcely seemedllikely to produce a cinematic ripple,
let alone a major wave. The industry was a Sargasso Sea of
mediocrity, becalmed by a decade of Nazi control, loss of the ·
major Berlin studios to the Soviet zone, and not least by the
escapist preferences of the Adenauer generation, which embraced video-style banality even before it could · afford to
•embrace TV. As late as the 1960s German studios were notable
chiefly for soft-core porn and the expert dubbing of Hollywood
imports. "German Films," a book title of the time sarcastically
observed, "Could Hardly be Better."
·

Frustration over this state of affairs boiled over in the socalled Oberhausen Manifesto of 1962, in which more than two
dozen young directors and writers, many barely in their
twenties, demanded a new approach to filmmaking unfettered
by the derivative and commercially motivated conventions of
the official cinema. Within a few years the rebels had
established bases of operation in Hamburg and especially in
Munich, which quickly became the Florence of the German film
renaissance. From here they launched their first "knapsack
films," low-budget productions which flaunted commercial
standards in the name of models drawn from Hollywood.films
noirs and the Franco-Italian avant garde. With the "German
Film Encounter" at Sorrento, Italy, a major collective showing
in 1973, the new directors were well launched ori a triumphant
tour of the 1970s' film festival circuit.
·
Serious cinema continues to burgeon, thanks in part to
belated government subsidies and a lively independent production and distribution network. The number of active filmmakers now runs into the hundreds. Only a half dozen or so,
however, have so far gained international recognition. Their
elder statesman is Alexander Kluge, the lawyer-turned-cineaste
who masterminded the Oberhausen protest. Born in 1932,
Kluge represents a personal link with the golden age of Weimar
cinema, having entered the field in the 1950s as an assistantto
Fritz . Lang, the master of siJent films .who fled to Hollywood
after Hitler's seizure of power. Volker Schlondorff (born 1939),
in contrast, served his apprenticeship under such French New
Wave directors as Alain Resnais and thus symbolizes the
connections between Oberhausen and the wider European
scene. From his Young Torless (1965), one of the first NewWave successes, to The Tin Drum, Schlondorffs films serve as,
clear landmarks of the movement's progre·ss. His wife,
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rorist kidnapping, murder, and suicide.
· In April three well-known terroristsAndreas Baader, Jan-Karl Raspe, and
Gudrun Ensslin-had been sentenced to
life imprisonment for the murders of four
American servicemen. Then on
September 5 industrialist Hans-Martin
Schleyer was kidnapped; terrorists
demanded as ransom the release of
Baader and ten other terrorists. After
West German commandos forced the
release of the Lufthansa plane hijacked to
Mogadishu, Baader, Raspe, and Ensslin
were found dead in their cells-official
cause of death: suicide. The next day,
October 19, Schleyer was found
murdered.
German reaction .to these events was
sharply divided. Many Germans were
willing to grant the state vastly expanded powers of search and arrest, for
they 'viewed the terrorists as a violent
threat to their still relatively young republic and, perhaps even more alarming,
to their hard-won prosperity. Others
sympathized with the terrorists, seeing in
them the conscience of a nation which
had become totally intoxicated with

capitalistic greed and imperialistic
arrogance.
·
Rather than wait for a sense of distance
and perspective, the makers of Germany
in. Autumn felt they had to give immediate expression to their pain,
confusion, and anger even if this response
would then consist of rough fragments.
From the extremely varied segments of
this film, three stand out as particularly
intense. Through skillful editing of the
documentary portion-the elaborate
funeral of Schleyer, attended by a host of
the three terrorists, complete with hostile
police guard-Kluge and Schlondorff
suggest that the terrorists, martyred
champions of the exploited, rather than
Schleyer, the exploiter, deserved the final
gratitude of the nation. This view is reinforced by the Scho"ndorff/ Boll segment
in which a major TV network decides
that a scheduled filming of Sophocles'
Antigone must be cancelled. After endless rehearsals and repeated editing of the
script, the network rejects. Antigone as
too inflammatory for West German
viewers. Violence as a legitimate response
to injustice, Antigone as female

terrorist-these themes are simply too
close to the realities in the Federal
Republic. The third memorable scene
evokes the strongest response in the
viewer. Here Fassbinder turns the
camera on himself. Fassbinder steps
nude before the camera; stripped of all
pretense of civility, he brutalizes his
homosexual lover and in sudden panic
flushes his cocaine down the toilet.
Through his own actions he thus makes
clear that boorishness, paranoia,
brutality, and obscenity run through
every social class and every sphere oflife.

Germany in Autumn obviously lacks
cohesion and balance, but the filmmakers felt that the all-pervasive mood of
anger, despair, and grief demanded an
immediate response. Even as
paramilitary units in armored tank-like
vehicles were still patrolling the streets of
Bonn, this aesthetically unsatisfying but
very powerful and controversial
expression of sorrow and pain . was
already playing to large and sharply
divided audiences throughout the
Federal Republic.
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Margarethe von Trotta, is a major director in her own right,
known particularly for sensitive but unsentimental portrayals
of modern women. Among those better known in Germany
than abroad, Hans-Jurgen Syberberg and the emigre' Frenchman Jean-Marie Straub (born 1933), have created a body of
highly intellectual works ranging from Straub's spare Chronicle
of Anna Magdalena Bach (1967) to Syberberg's recent epic, .
Hitler, . A Film From Germany. More straightforwardly
cinematic is the work of Wim Wenders, who since his experimentalist first feature, The Goalie's Anxiety at the Penalty Kick
( 1966), has fused a Beatles-era pop mentality with dark-hued
Hollywood at its best in such films as The American Friend.
Others only belatedly earning attention abroad are Werner
Schroeter and Reinhard Hauff. Their recent works, including
Hauffs Knife in the Head (1978) and Schroeter's awardwinning Palermo or Wolfsburg (1980), deal frankly with such
chronic German problems as terrorism and the plight of foreign
workers.
At the crest of the New Wave, beyond question, are Werner
Herzog and Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Like Ingmar Bergman,
their colleague of sorts in Munich since his self-imposed exile
from Sweden, Herzog and Fassbinder are nodal figures in their
own private filmmaking communit~es, working on picture after
picture with the same tightly-knit fraternity of actors and
technicians. Fassbinder is a director of almost manic productivity; at age 35 he has already made some three dozen major
.films, not to mention a long list of television and stage credits.

His work alternately revolts and attracts. Candid about his own
less than gay homosexuality, he is a gut-level Marxist ala JeanLuc Godard, obsessed by the corruption of power and
unsparing in the dissection of his own experience and that of .
Germany at large. From costume dramas to gangster films,
psychological soap operas to black comedies, his films run the
gamut of themes and styles, a melange of banality, originality,
and brutal frankness with few parallels in modern cinema.
Herzog (born 1942), whose Aguirre, Wrath of God was per-
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Margarethe von Trotta: The Second
A wakening of Christa Klages ( 1977)
This film makes most sense to an
American audience against the background of West Germany as the land of
contrasts: bourgeois conservatism versus
total disregard for societal norms, order
and efficiency versus terrorist destruction, rigid authoritarianism versus
radical anarchism. Christa Klages opens
with scenes of Christa, caring and nonauthoritarian teacher, playing with the
children of the preschool she has
founded. Then abruptly this idyllic scene
is shattered by the arrival of the police.
Due to lack of funds the school is forced
·to close. To protect her island of peace
and love, Christa commits armed bank
robbery; the basically gentle and idealistic Christa becomes a desperate fugitive
.from the law.
At this point, the film evolves into the
story of three women. Christa, overwhelmed by the peril of her situation,
seeks help from a former friend. This
friend is herself trapped in a repressive
and lonely marriage to an officer in
Germany's armed forces, a man who already by virtue of his profession is a
symbol of rigid conformity to traditional values and authoritarian social
structures. Christa's friend breaks free
from society. The third important
woman, the bank teller who witnessed
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the crime, embarks on an obsessive
search for the robber. When, however,
the police finally capture Christa and ask
the teller to identify her, this insignificant bank employee deliberately lies,
claiming that Christa is not the woman
the police are seeking. Gradually this
teller had come to understand Christa, to
realize that Christa represents an alternative to the narrow and stultifying life in
which the teller also finds herself trapped.
All three women reject society's conventional conception of happiness. They
come to the insight that they must pursue
their own ideals even if this pursuit
involves a · rejection of men and the
violent overthrow of societal norms.

Volker Schlondorff: The Tin Drum
(1978/79)
Like the novel of Gunther Grass, the
film version of The Tin Drum overwhelms one with its abundance of bizarre
figures and episodes. Central to the entire
film is the deliberate action by which
three-year-old Oskar, in protest against
the vanity and hypocrisy of adult society,
puts an end to his physical growth and
thus wills to observe rather than participate in a corrupt society. From this
vantage point he watches the adulterous
passion smoldering between his mother
and her cousin, the suicidal compulsion
of his guilt-ridden mother to gorge

herself on rotten fish, the mass hysteria of
the Germans under the banner of the
swastika, and 'the grotesquely fatal attempt of his father to erase the evidence
of his Nazi past by swallowing his party
badge. Oskar also personally witnesses
the German invasion of the free city of
Danzig-and thus the outbreak of World
War II.

Repelled by all the evil about him,
Oskar sees himself in the roll of saboteur.
By drumming a Viennese waltz against
the beat of a Nazi hymn, Oskar manages
to bring a Nazi rally to a very abrupt end.
With his unique scream Oskar shatters
church windows, forcing his mother to
rush to the bedroom window and thus
leave, if only for a few moments, her bed
of adultery. But in the end, almost
without realizing what he is doing, Oskar
also compromises himself. Together with
a company of dwarfs, for example, he
entertains the troops at the front but
never even notices the irony of his situation. Like so many later protest figures of
the sixties and seventies, Oskar imagines
he can extricate himself from the corruption of society, but his infantile protest
.remains in the end pitifully ineffective.
Rainer Werner Fassbinder: Lili Marleen
(1981)
The title of Fassbinder's lastest film
evokes immediate recognition from a

haps the first international cult film of the German Wave, is an
original of an altogether different sort. In a gesture typical of his
. Promethean outlook, he travelled on foot the 600 miles between
Munich and Paris in 1975 to honor the film historian ·Lotte
Eisner, stricken in France by a heart attack. Legendary for his
exotic locales and unconventional methods (for one film, Heart ·
of Glass, he had the entire cast placed under hypnosis), Herzog
is a latter-day romantic, unreconciled to technological society,
whose hauntingly beautiful films explore his fascination with
evil, madness, and the apocalyptic possibilities he perceives in
the confrontation of Nature and Society.
Sins of the Fathers
Their virulent distaste for commercialism aside, what do
these directors have in common? On the surface, very little.
Herzog has remarked that when he and Fassbinder meet, they
compliment each other on their wardrobes-and then have
little to say. They and the others sense they can be understood as
a single cultural generation, sharing a common experience of
time and place and the challenges of defining themselves over
against that experience.
Iri purely cinematic terms the most obvious commonality is
negative: the absence of an immediate past, a continuous tradition on which to build. The only tradition that exists is an inter. rupted one, dormant since the heyday of Weimar expressionism
represented by such classics as The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari,
Nosferatu, and M. The originality and significance of Weimar

cinema is a matter of some critical debate, as is the extent of its
influence on the current generation. Many critics prefer to see
the New Wave as either sui generis or an offshoot of other
European movements. While Bonn is clearly not Weimar,
either politically or culturally, it is possible to detect certain
general affinities in cinematic outlook and technique between
the two eras. The best case in point is Herzog, whose long march
to Paris was a pilgrimmag~ in honor of the world's foremost
student of expressionist cinema and whose recent Nosferatu is a
_conscious (and highly creative) remake of Murnau's silent
classic.
In most ·cases the connections are more subtle. There is, on
occasion, the use of extreme camera angles and lighting effects,
. heavy diagonals and distorted perspectives-all typical
expressionist devices to communicate · tension · and a
psychologized reality. There is also a more . than passing
similarity between the cluttered interiors favored by
Fassbinder, among others, which surround characters with the
detritus of consumerism, and the strikingly claustrophic
framing effects in many earlier films, with their dark borders
imprisoning actors visually within the camera's artificial
borders just as, symbolically, the characters they represent are
caught in the toils of madness, want, or some other force of
destiny. In the New Wave films those imprisoning agents are
likely . to be frighteningly mundane. Almost all the current
directors have explored in some fashion the modern dilemma of
the outsider, trapped in relationships-political, social,
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German public. Many Americans too,
however, are familiar with the figure of
the seductive Lili Marleen, for Lili is the
central figure in a song played and sung
on all fronts and by both sides, in
German and about fifty other languages,
first of all in World War II and then also
in the wars in Jndochina, Korea, Israel;
and Vietnam. In fact, it is said that so
powerful was the spell cast by this song
that when each evening Radio Belgrade
broadcast the Lale Anderson rendition of
Lili Marleen as its sign-off number, guns
fell silent until the final words of the song,
": .. wer wird bei der Laterne stehn mit
dir, Lili Marleen, mtt dir, Lili Marleen,"
had faded from the air. With her
sensuous voice Lale Anderson evoked for
the soldier in the trenches a vision of both
the faithful girlfriend at home and the
seductive prostitute outside the barracks.
The film Lili Marleen portrays in
fictionalized form the career of Lale
Anderson as Lili Marleen. Lale, forced to
leave Switzerland and her Jewish lover,
very rapidly soars to a position of success and privilege in Hitler's Germany.
She entertains the troops, shares intimacies with high-ranking SS-officers,
and revels in ·the material rewards
bestowed for her contribution to Hitler's
war. Somehow, though, she fails to
recognize that she has compromised

herself. After all, she insists, all she did
was sing a song. She insists that she was
only trying to bring herself through these
dangerous times and bears no taint of
guilt.
Lili Marleen raises significant
questions in two important areas. First, it
places a huge question mark behind the
names of all those artists who continued
to perform and produce in Germany
between 1933 and 1945 in such a way that
not only were they not incarcerated but
were in many cases even honored and
rewarded. Secondly, this film questions
the motives behind the renewal of
German interest in the period of the
Third Reich. Does Fassbinder here direct
a serious and critical gaze at the issue of
artist as collaborator? Or is it possible
that Fassbinder realized that significant
numbers of Germans might find the sight
of brownshirts, Hitler portraits, and Nazi
rallies pleasantly titillating? For many
the prospect of sex under the shadow of
the swastika might provide exceptionally
entertaining stimulation. This question
of intent and effect remains in the end
quite open.

Lili Marleen, Fassbinder

Rainer Werner Fassbinder: The
Merchant of Four Seasons (1971)
Fassbinder places in the center of his
film Hans, peddler of fruit. Sent off to the
Foreign Legion by a mother who viewed
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sexual-which allow him neither his full humanity nor the
saving grace of breaking away. Oskar, the self-willed dwarf of
The Tin Drum who baffles many uninitiated viewers, becomes
considerably more comprehensible when seen in terms of this
tradition. In the broadest sense, what the new cinema owes to the silent
screen is a basic disinclination, not to say inability, to take
surface reality at face value. Caligari's grandchildren are
haunted by the dark underside of. rationality; they cannot
ignore the demonic potential lurking in even the most benign
technology and the most humane ambitions. This spiritual
stance is crucial to the New Wave's generational identity. If they
lack an immediate cinematic past, these filmmakers are
burdened by an all too immediate historical past. Born for the
most part during or just before World War II, they have grown
up to experience both the deprivations of total war and unconditional defeat and also the unparalleled prosperity of West
Germany's postwar economic miracle. On the one hand they
have reaped Hitler's whirlwind. Their collective childhood
bears the stigma of a regime whose bureaucratized in.humanity
made a host of Germans, through war and Holocaust, petty
accomplices to absolute evil. As adults, on the other hand, they
live in a society which, like Carlyle's Enlightenment ("soul
extinct but stomach well alive"), seems to many to have sacrificed culture to commerce, embracing materialism as an escape
from the moral obligations of the past.
Like many of the writers-Boll, Grass, Lenz-whose work
they find congenial, filmmakers have been drawn almost compulsively to this unmastered past. At times they confront it

directly, as in Syberberg's Hitler or Fassbinder's newest
production, Lili Marleen. At other times the approach is more
oblique, as in Herzog's Aguirre or Woyzeck. Or, as in the
controversial collective work, Germany in Autumn, the
stimulus may come from yesterday's news headline: Whatever ·
the approach, however, a basic dilemma remains. Past and
present may be experienced as densely interconnected , yet
neither one adequately accounts for the other. Weighed against
the horrific fact of Hitlerism, the good life and a rising Gross
National Product amount to very little. The search for a moral
equilibrium has been complicated if not confounded by filmmakers' inability to ignore the fundamental dichotomies in
contemporary German society, with its glaring contrasts
between material ·abundance and spiritual vacuity, between
middle-class complacency and the destructiveness of a
managerial ethic, between a pervasive presentism and the
unlaid ghost of the Fuhrer.
From the banality of ultimate evil to the banality of ultimate
prosperity: this polar experience of the human condition gives
the New German Cinema much of its perplexing intensity.
Unreconciled to past and present alike, but oppressed by both,
filmmakers lack luxury of either hope or nostalgia. What they
have created in their films is an implicit vocabulary of
apocalypse, a cinema hypersensitive to evil and skeptical of
human autonomy but lacking any positive alternative, whether
personal salvation or the American Dream, to which it can
confidently appeal. In Germany, the sins of the fathers indeed
seem visited upon the children, and the children have become
· their own worst enemies.
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him as basically unlovable, rejected by
his one "great love" because of his proletarian status, exploited by his wife as a
source of income, Hans finally drinks
himself to his death . Through t he figure
of Hans, Fassbinder speaks for all the
victims of society too demoralized and
inarticulate to speak for themselves.
Rainer

Werner

Fassbinder:

The

Marriaf?e of Maria Braun ( 1978)
Maria Braun, separated by the war
from her husband of one day, trades sex
with a black GI for both American
dollars and emotional support. Surprised
by the sudden appearance of the
husband, she had given up for dead,
Maria accidently murders her lover.
Ma ria's husband takes the rap for the
murder. At this point begins the
courageous but ultimately very sad a ttempt of Maria to make it financially for
her husband . Fassbinder here creates a
profound statement about postwar
German ·restoration, viewing it as a
prostitution of the spirit for the sake of
ma terial prosperity.
Wim Wenders: The American Friend
(1976/77)
Although on the surface a fast -paced
adventure film, The A merican Friend
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questions in a very basic way the prevailing values of postwar Germany.
Because of its highly critical vie·w of
American influence in Germany, it is
particularly interesting when viewed as a
companion piece of Herzog's Stroszek.
Werner Herzog: The Enigma of Kaspar
Hauser ( 1974)
In the 18:lO's there appeared in the city
of Ntirnberg a very st range ma n. Almost
completely uncivilized-his only speech
consisted of a few grunts, and he could
barely walk-this young man seemed to
. have come from nowhere. Blind to his ·.
extraordinary vulnerability and his
exceptional nobility of spirit, the brutish
townspeople reject his mute pleas for
understanding. With great cruelty they
try to force him to conform to their
supposedly superior norms. In this very
moving and sad film Herzog challenges
many of the most widely accepted values
of modern society.

Werner Herzog: Woyzeck (1978)
A film ' version of Btichne r 's
nineteenth-century drama, Woyzeck,
portrays the passive suffering and final
violent revolt of an extremely sensitive
but brutally exploited human being.

Werner Herzog: Nosferatu ( 1978)
In t his reworking of Murnau's classic
vampire film of 1922, Herzog exposes the
despe rate seriousness of the eternal battle
between good and evil. Fascinating is the
final twist whereby the vampire evokes
no longer only fear and hate but also pity
and eventually even love.

The Marriage of Maria Braun, Fassbinder

.Gallery Seven een

The Peasant and the Bird-nester, 1568.
Pieter Breughel; the Elder
Panel, 23-1/4" x 26-3/4".
The art work of Pieter Breughel has captivated many different audiences in the four centuries through
which it has survived. Critics during that time period have found anything from Boschlike elements to Italian
mannerism _in his paintings. This is not surprising for Breughel's canvasses reveal grotesque images of death
and decay; they breathe life into pastoral hunting scenes; they give artistic interpretations of Biblical
passages . .. and the list continues. Whatever his subject matter, Breughel was a genius at capturing profound
little snatches of wisdom on canvas. This portrayal of a traditional Netherlandish proverb ("he who knows
where the nest is has the knowledge; he who robs it has the nest") succeeds in uncovering the folly of self. righteousness. While the peasant angelically points a pious finger at the venturesome nest-thief, he is
oblivious to the fact that because of his otherworldly concern, he himself has lost his packages and is about to
fall into the river!
·
·
·
-Fran DeJong
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So, as the saying goes, "ls there life after collef?e?" (read
Calvin). In the springtime, that question gains prominence
among about 1/5 of Calvin's students-the seniors. Since
students at Calvin can't yet answer this q_uestion, Dialogue
sent out this question to 20 graduates. We picked a variety of
former students, those who had been in the p ublications, the
sciences, or were simply studen ts; not unexpected(v we got a
limited response.
Yet, a wide geographical and vocational spectrum is
represented by those who did respond: Eric Wolterstorff is in
his second year of graduate work in Art History at Yale;
Rosanne Lopers Sweetman is an educational services coordinator and library supervisor at the Institute of Ch ristian Studies
in ·Toronto; Steve Krosschel/ will be graduating f rom the law
school at the University of Michigan this spring; Glenn Bulthuis
is a blue collar worker and som etime perform er out in
California,· Harry Stout, a fo rmer troublemaker and radical
from the late six ties, is a visiting professor f rom the Universitv
of Connecticut at Calvin's history department. Dialogue hop~s
these letters will hath help seniors consider how they will live
when no longer an undergraduate student and give some
indication of what Calvin has been to those who have gone
before.

Rosanne Lopers
Sweetman
To sit down and describe fo r you my version of "The Life
After Calvin" story is to admit that the farther I get into the
story, the more certain I am that Calvin will continue to be a
main character in it. But that's like reading to you the concluding pages of a novel.
Towards the end of my senior year at Calvin, most of my
friends and I were adamant about finding employment that was
meaningful, self-fulfilling, with potential fo r creativity, independence, and societal improvement. We were optimistic about
the ability to transform culture into one dominated by Christian
principles and eager to enter the quiet revolution that would set
secularism on its ear. After all, we had all the proper ammunition: a Christian world-and-life view, a supportive and equally
commited circle of friends, and a Calvin College B.A.
A number of my friends chose to embellish their arsenals
before entering the fray via a stint at graduate school. I too
toyed with that idea, half-heartedly. I suspected that no
respectable Canadian university would accept me into their
graduate studies in French in the first place, and what could I do
with an advanced degree in French?- Translate? Too
mechanical, too closely tied into government bureaucracy.
Teach? Too common and too easy a choice. I would console
myself that I at least was une Canadienne bilingue and could
address fellow citizens in either of our nation's idioms.
But that brought me no closer to job. In my idealistic search
for meaningful employment that provided a modest income and
room to be creative, influential, and independent, I
systematically eliminated a host of possibilities. Administration was a lot of empty bureaucracy. Industry alienated you

a
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''Tidings from
from your work and was run by a bunch of money-grubbing
capitalists. Business and commerce were responsible for consumerism, bad neighborhoods, and all forms of pollution. And
so on. I wondered whether I could wing it as a freelance writer
or a social worker and I remember feeling rather desperate. Had
I crossed the dangerous line that separates a healthy critique of
society from a harmful cynicism about it?
I was more fortunate than a lot of my friends in trying to deal
with that question. One month before I graduated, Calvin
offered me a job as their first Canadian student recruitment
officer. Within a year I was off to Toronto to set up Calvin's first
branch plant. All of this meant that I could nestle in the arms of
alma mater for a while longer and postpone my debut into that
cold, misguided society. What a cruel irony! After all those
years of bitching about Calvin's administration, just like any of
its students did and still does, I joined the establishment.
Gradually my perspective on it changed. I began to see the
need for some of the rules and regulations that seemed so
absurd to me as a student. I saw how easily bureaucratization
crept into administrative routine, and I knelt before the idol of
efficiency more often than I ought to have. It was hard work to
provide meaningful and challenging tasks for my assistants and
just as difficult to avoid getting caught up in the numbers
games that the Admissions Office plays a little too seriously.
The change in status that this position gave me with respect to
the faculty was pleasant. To call them by their first names and to
make good friends among them allowed for many occasions to
discuss the realities of Christian responsibility and impressed
upon me the need to work out of a Christian community.
When finally I left Calvin's payroll, it felt like I exited a
theatre by way of the many rooms backstage.
And still my life is inextricably tied up with Calvin College.
Calvin alumni wear a steady path to Toronto and moving here
was like moving into an old neighborhood-:-a host of familiar
faces . This not only made the city attractive and the community of friends a natural one, but it reinforced "the Calvin
connection." Certainly we have all grown a lot since those days
in Grand Rapids, but it seems that that growth may not have
been so great had we not had that common experience to build
on. (Don't let the Admissions people put that into one of their
pieces of promotional literature, please.)
The Institute for Christian Studies, which forms a natural
focal point for our community, is where I now hold office.
There is a natural tendency for the ICS and Calvin to exchange
speakers, information and resources, which perpetuates ties to
Calvin from as large an area as the ICS influences and prolongs
the days that Calvin influences us. When I plan a conference
with one of our professors, we regularly look to Calvin for

Babylon" II
speakers, ideas, and co-sponsorship. Interims always brings us
into contact. We often share guest speakers from abroad.
Calvin's library has provided invaluable service as we continue
to develop our resources. And Chimes, when it makes its spotty
appearance on our periodical display shelves, frequently
provides animated discussion while it soothes nostalgia.
Finally, how can one avoid conversations about Calvin when so
many friends and relatives still live on its doorstep?
There is only one conclusio_n to this account: life after Calvin
for me is more Calvin. I have not given up the ideals I set out
with when I graduated in 1977. They have simply been placed
into a much different context than I imagined , but nevertheless a significant one. And as long as I live and work here, as
long as I hold membership in the Christian Reformed Church,
as long as I remain committed to the cause of Christian education, Calvin will be on the scene somewhere. If only I can avoid
the easy pitfall facing anyone who works for an organization to
which she has a heart commitment-that of navel-gazing on the
minor problems so long that the overall thrust of efforts to bring
in the Kingdom are sacrificed-I can live with that and even
take comfort in it.

Glenn ·Bulthuis
Having never contributed to Dialogue dunng my college
daz , I found it surprising that you were interested to hear my
views on "the Calvin experience" and the broader questions of
ultimate reality in the 80's. I can't say I have any ·answers, but
perbaps what I have gained since graduating in 1977 is that you
can spend a lot of time looking for the ." answers" and fail to
appreciate what's going on around you.
What is he saying?-Well, let's see, there seem to be two
types of students at Calvin (or any college). On the one hand
you have the folks who know exactly what they want to do after
college and on the other hand you have folks like me who· go to
school for four years and still don't "find themselves." Traditionally we've called the people in the latter group, "hippies,
leeches, Canadians, philosophers, jocks, artsies, . potheads or
nimrods." The people in the first group 9ave been traditionally"
called, "RA's, pre-meds, business majors, fine respectable kids,
Republicans, Christians or good marriage material." The
people in the "together" group generally are relatively success-

ful, happy, not very spontaneous, and generally live long dull
monotonous lives. The people in · the "untogether'' group
however, eith r burn out or discover exciting occupations after
spending many more years "figuring out what they want to do ."
Look at Ronald Reagan, he's come a long way since "Bedtime
for Bonzo" (or has he?).
All I'm trying o say, is that for too long we have been conditioned i·n to thinking a person with four years of college should
know exact ly what they want to do for the rest of their life. Face
it, I'm a lot different than I was four years ago. Why do I have to
live . with a decision I made when I was 21 (a mere baby). So I
guess the thought is, one shouldn't feel pressured into having to
"be something" right away . We aren't all the same and for the
"togethers" to point an accusing finger at the "untogethers" and
say, "Why can't you be like us?" is like saying, why can't fish be
like birds?
I suppose I could be accused of over-simplifying the whole
question of "life after Calvin," and I don't mean to minimize the
importanc of thinking in terms of establishing some sort of
career. But then ai•ain, you can t11r n grey figuring out what you
want to do. God has plans for · II of us, and it's marvelous to see
how things work out. Generally God will open doors when you
are ready to go through them, at least it has worked out that way
for me.
I guess it's all a matt r offiguring out what makes you happy.
If being married and having money and owning a home and
having a family is important for you then your career decision
will be different than the guy who enjoys traveling and r~ading
. and Woody Allen's (later) movi~s. I don't think it's fair to call
the one guy a success and the other guy a bum, but I'm sure
you'll run into people who will feel that way, but that's their
problem. It took me a while before I figured out that I was
trying too hard to be like other people wanted me to be and not
realizing what I wanted to be.
.
So there are some random thoughts. Best wishes to all of the
"untogethers," give yourselves time and don't let Dad and Mom
get you bummed out about being a bum.
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Eric Wolterstorff
Yale University has admirably served my interests and needs
as a scholar. The research facilities are outstanding. Many of
my professors are the experts in their fields . My program is
relaxed and flexible. My department demands no f ormai
requirements-no exams, no comprehensives, no masters
thesis-but has high expectations for my performance on term
papers and in class discussion. Although few of my fellow
students display the intellectual brilliance and vivacity which I
so enjoyed among my friends on the faculty and in the student
body at Calvin-art history seems not to be densely populated
with such people-they all seem to be highly knowledgeable
and well read in the literature of the discipline. I perform
academic penance daily to gain the comprehension of the
history of art which I only began to grasp as an undergraduate.
But every new area which I explore deepens my appreciation for
humankind's creative and expressive gifts, and encourages me
to plunge deeper into my studies.
Fortunately, my experience of Yale has not been exclusively
academic. The cultural life and the social and spiritual life also
dominate my perceptions of this tradition-bound, nearly threecentury-old institution. Soon after arriving I was immersed in
many rich cultural activities. The ivy-covered Gothic Revival
buildings and the fine university art museums stimulate one's
visual senses and catalyze other creative activities. And
although many of the undergraduates are no brighter than anywhere else and are only at Yale because a parent preceded them ,
all packed together on campus they form an intensely creative
bunch. The total productive energy is greater than the sum of
the parts. A mound of earth is overnight transformed into a
sleeping dragon. Musicians offer spontaneous recitals. The
Wifrn Poors, a well-known undergraduate chorus gather in,
the "nave" of the library and suddenly break into crisp
harmony. The students heavily support Yale's own offBroadway theater and the two or three films shown every night.
Halloween conjures up a remarkable array of costumed
nocturnal creatures. Such unpredictable events are exciting and
inspiring, but also distracting. Nevertheless, I revel in it all.
But as exciting as the cultural immersion has been for me, it
has also produced loneliness and introspection, for I engage in
these activities as an outsider. I recognize in retrospect that
a rich aspect of my college life at Calvin was the tremendous
overlap of my academic, cultural, social and spiritual lives.
Classes and Plato Club brought me together with housemates
and friends of all sorts for rigorous intellectual discussions.
Cultural activities usually flowed or degenerated into social
events of varying degrees of rowdiness. Worship services frequently were followed with coffee at someone's apartment. And
spiritual life extended from Sunday through the week and gave
me new friendships and strengthened the old.
In graduate school .at Yale, however, these various areas of
my life have been distinct. I am thankful to have a small group
of Calvin alumni and other Christian friends which I see
occasionally during the week but otherwise my religious life is
restricted to Sunday worship. The people I worship with are no
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longer the people I socialize with, and these are no longer the
people I study with. This radical separateness of the different
areas of my daily life has hampered my adjustment to the rigors
of graduate life.
I am thankful that God has been helping me, if not to break
down, at least gradually to cross over the barriers separating
these areas. For example, a new friend in my graduate
dormitory this year is a Presbyterian from Wheaton, who
bridges my domestic and religious lives. A Calvin alumnus has
become a racketball partner and sharer ·of exotic culinary
interests, thus bridging athletic and social lives. Little by little,
the increasing number of such contacts makes my life more
complex and more satisfying.
On a broader level, however, I have found it important to
recognize the religious leanings in many of the other
people I meet. A secular university is not secular in the way
many ingrown Calvin students might think. "Secular" does not
mean that one sees nothing but rampant paganism, although
there is some of that. It does not mean that no one believes in
anything outside of herself or himself. Rather, "secular" at Yale
means that there is no unifying religious perspective. At Calvin
one is confronted · by a bristling phalanx of would-be
Reformers; at Yale nearly every imaginable faith is represented, many in small fanatical splinter groups. And the last
thing these people want is for me to attempt to transform
culture out from beneath their feet. The Jewish contingentover 30 percent of the student body-is the largest and most
visible of Yale sub-cultures. Many of these Jews are orthodox.
Many other people had a nominal Christian upbringing, now
disregarded or rebelled against. And a surprising number of
people are deeply moral and ethical, without being dogmatically Christian. Their overwhelming generosity and goodwill
are examples to me. My education at Calvin has left me illequipped to respond to such people. They are ardently searching for, and, I think, finding some of the Truth. Do I preach
Total Deprativy and Original Sin or should I recognize that
they too are doing the work of the Lord by bringing love and
compassion into the world? At the very least I am thankful to
have a few of these people as friends.

Steve;Krosschell
\:, .

I feel a resistence to everything "religious" growing in
me. Often this is an instinctive revulsion-11•hich is
certain(\' not a good thing either. I am not a religious
type. But I am constantl_1· tMnking of God and of Christ
and genuineness, life, freedom, and mercv mean a lot to
me. Only the religious trappings they 11·eor I find so
uncomfortable.
- Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Recently, I envisioned myself wanting to convince some
lawyers that juries should be abolished. Despite my desire, however, I could say nothing. The vision ended with that image, of
me, speechless, with mouth opening and closing like a fish out
of water.·
·
The vision expresses my dilemma. Can I persuade others
while remaining Reformed? More geneially, is Reformed life in

a post-Christian world possible?
This dilemma exists because Reformed strategies for living in
the world fail.
For example, one reformed strategy is preaching the Word.
In my envisioned situation, preaching might mean calling the
jury system to repentance for not bei'ng divinely instituted.
Preaching, however, requires uncritical acceptance of its
private vision. It fails when the congregation seeks publicly
accessible arguments that one position is best. This strategy
precludes a public process of persuasion and therefore is ineffective in a post-Christian world.
Another Reformed strategy is asserting that opposing beliefs
·are religious. Applying this strategy to my situation, I might
explain how the American faith in the people is religious and
then observe that, therefore, a faith injuries has no firmer basis
than the Reformed faith. This observation, however, cuts both
ways. The opposition can argue that the Reformed faith
likewise has no firmer basis than the secular faith. The strategy
confutes its.elf and, therefore, is als·o ineffective in our world .
A third strategy is finding contradictions in opposing
religious beliefs. This strategy fails in my situation because
sophisticated defenses of juries are not clearly self-contradictory. Moreover, attacking inconsistencies in other positions
is improper when Reformed theology itself contains such inconsistencies as the contradictions between unconditional election
and missions and between Romans 4: 1-8 and James 2:20-24.
Reformed Christians should not use this strategy.
A fourth strategy is invoking shared religious beliefs. In my
envisioned situation, however, the two sides agree on few
relevant beliefs. A strategy requiring shared religious views
usually fails in today's pluralized world .
A final strategy is appealing to common grace, to innate
notions of truth and goodness. Applying this strategy, I might
argue that juries cannot understand complex legal issues or
examine evldence impartially. This strategy can be effective, but
using no other strategy is not Reformed. According to
Reformed theology, only special grace induces redemption.
Consequently, appealing solely to common grace is not acting
redemptively. Reformed humans, however, must always act
redemptively. Since the other strategies fail, this strategy, too,
cannot be used by Reformed humans in the modern world.
This list of ineffective strategies is suggestive but proves little.
Reformed thinkers can avoid my criticisms by devising other
strategies. Consequently, I now level four broader charges ·
against Reformed thinking.
First, Reformed religiousness fosters inflexibility. According
to Reformed thinking, humans always have in mind religious
perspectives or control beliefs that determine the acceptability
or other beliefs. Obviously, beliefs contradicting the control
beliefs are never acceptabk. Hence, religious Control beliefs are
immutable. Clearly, under this assumption, persuading those
with different religious beliefs is impossible.
Second, Reformed religiousness produces a misunderstanding of surface reality. Religions always interpret, dig
beneath the surface, find meaning. Not everything is meaningful, however, nor should it be. Furthermore, many meaningful
objects should first be known apart from their meaning. By
religiously focusing on the meaning of existence, Reformed
thinkers miss the surface of existence and consequently cannot
act effectively in it.
Third, the Reformed dialectic between absolute sin and
absolute grace makes conscientious action in the world
impossible. If Reformed Christians are unredeemed, then they
are totally depraved. If they are redeemed , then they must be
perfected. Nevertheless, they sin, Those who see both this sinful
actuality and perfection's necessity become pa_ralyzed, as I and
many friends have been. Others, unaware of perfection's

necessity, are unaware of their own redemption and hence not
Reformed. Still others, who see only perfection's necessity, can
be blissfully ignorant of ethical choices, confident that their
moneymaking, theorizing, baking, and sculpting are building a
Christian culture. Thus, Reformed actions in the world . are
either totally depraved, paralyzed, or blissfully ignorant.
Hence, they cannot be conscientious.
Last, Reformed beliefs about transcendence are unjustified
because Reformed grace is invalid. Clearly, some elect have not
learned which beliefs are essential for redemption, because, if all
elect have acquired this knowledge, then John Paul II, Herman
Hoeksema, or Billy Graham are damned, a horrible result.
Now, one purpose of grace is teaching the elect this knowledge.
Hence, grace can be thwarted. Reformed grace, however, is
irresistible and cannot be thwarted. Hence, since the other
premises seem true, the Reformed assumption of grace's
validity must be false. Of course, if grace is invalid, then totally
depraved, immanent humans are incapable of knowing
transcendance.
Seeking religious transcendence is useless. Humans should
concentrate on immanent values, knowing truth, doing good,
and loving others.
I cannot end so bravely. Probably, I act in reality because I
desire to save it, }?ut, as I have asserted, religious desires
frustrate action. In other words, I reject religiousness because I
accept it. Resolving this tension may have frightening consequences. Who am I if not religious? Furthermore, humans
cannot fathom transcendence, but some may hear its whisper, a
susuration of distant drums. Does secularity preclude hearing
those drums?
I am compelled and afraid.

Skip Stout
On January 16, 1981 I returned to Calvin for the first time in
twelve years as a visiting professor in the department of history.
It is a visit I had looked forward to for many months. Of the
many forces pulling me back, one of the most compelling was_
an irresistible curiosity to acquaint myself with a new generation of students who (as I have since been: reminded) were in
grammar school while l attended college. I knew what Calvin
was like during my student years (1965-69), and I know what
campus life is like at the University of Connecticut where I have
taught for the past six years. What I did not know was where
Calvih lay along that spectrum· of experience today. After three
months on campus I have found it is surprisinglydiffe'rent from
both sets of experiences.
From the first day of my arrival in the Michigan snow and
cold, my visit has been made warmer by the entire college community. In a far briefer time •than I ever thought possible, I ·
moved beyond the nostalgia of remembered friendships, to
experience the joys of newly-formed friendships with faculty
and students. Such friendships, I think, only could develop s<;>'
rapidly in an atmosphere of trust that grows from a shared
universe of meaning. I don't remember appreciating or even
understanding the bonding power of shared values while I was a
student at Calvin: at that time "worldview" was just another
hyphenated word I learned to inject irt my tests and papers. The
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benefits only became plain after . living in a university
environment where I have observed alternative world-views
and, more importantly, where I have watched people live with
the consequences of those views.
In still other respects the past three months have made me
aware of the benefits of Calvin in ways I couldn't see as a
student. It is only from a distance that I can appreciate the advantage of a faculty who define their careers primarily around
the needs of their students. While a student, I took the interest
of professors in my work and life for granted-there was no
other standard by which to evaluate their behavior. Now I am
particularly impressed with the close relationships between
teacher and student that are actively encouraged and emphasized by the college. Such relationships are not wholly lacking in
a university, but neither are they emphasized: good teaching has
little ·to do with tenure or promotion. In my own teaching
experience I have found that relationships with students tend to
be dominated by · graduate students, leaving the
undergraduates, by necessity, shortchanged. Whatever the advantages in terms of research facilities and faculty specialization that a university represents, I am convinced that in terms of
a complete educational experience Calvin has far more to offer.
But if Calvin today is far different from a public university, it
is also a different school from the one I attended, and it is those
differences that most engage- my interest. On returning to
campus I was mentally prepared to step into a school that remained static-a fascimile of the one I attended over a decade
ago. Such is clearly not the case. The times-are-a-changin' at
Calvin and, I think, changing in ways that strengthen the college community. For one, it is impossible to ignore the large,
and apparently still growing, numbers of non-Dutch, non-CRC
people who are filling out the student body. As a non-Dutch,
non-CRC person myself (who, upon first arrival on campus,
was surprised to discover that Calvin was a "Dutch" school!), I
naturally applaud this trend. Although I never felt excluded or
discriminated against for my ethnicity, I do remember sensing
that there were large number of American Christians "out
there" in the world who were ignored, overlooked, or, most
commonly, just plain misunderstood. The result was to create
something of a fortress mentality at the college which was unnecessarily restrictive and closed off to kindred spiritis. Such
isolation is no longer possible. New voices can be heard from a
number of directions: in letters to Chimes, opinions in the
classroom, questions raised after class, and in conversations in
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Calvin Women ( 1979)
the Commons. As Calvin continues to open itself outward to
American and Canadian Christians generally, it cannot help
but complicate the texture and diversity of the student body in
ways that will strengthen the college's testimony to the larger
society in which it functions.
A second area of change at Calvin is so conspicuous that it
represented, to me anyway, something of a plenary jolt: the
liberation of Calvin's female students. To fully appreciate the
change I see around me, you must imagine a different world of
institutional arrangements based upon an inviolable double
standard of acceptable behavior for ·men and women. In this
world, women were known generally as "co-eds" who lived,
appropriately enough, in the "Co-ops" that lined Franklin
Street by the old campus, . or on the newly constructed
Knollcrest campus. At Knollcrest, where I lived, there was a
male dorm and a female dorm, separated by a cafeteria and
.about 50 yards of concrete walkway. The cold physical separation of living space expressed a far deeper separation that ex- tended to all areas of campus life. In my dorm (NoordewierVanderwerp) we were pretty much free to come and go as we
pleased. For we men, dorm life was a liberation from home, and
a window of access to "the world" just down the road-at the
Pantlind Hotel. Not so for women whose dorms existed to
shield them from that world, and who were subject to rules of
acceptable behavior which, in many instances, were more
repressive than ones they observed at home. Instead of freedom
of movement, they were assigned "hours" of in-house residence
(after 10:00 weeknights, l l :00 weekends) which were
scrupulously observed to the minute. If these hours were transgressed-say on a date that lasted later than expected-they
were given a "campus" (a sort of minimum security confinement on Saturday_ night), while the !11ale co-participants were
left free to frolic-as-usual.
As campus life expanded outward beyond the dorms, the
double standard followed. I remember (to my everlasting
regret) learning to smoke cigarettes at Calvin, and I smoked
them everywhere (hurrah!). Cigarette smoking on campus was
strictly prohibited to women except for one room in their dorm
basement (a "concession" first granted in my sophomore year).
Apart fom a Wednesday night "dress-up" dinner (the least
attended meal of the week), I could dress as I pleased. Women,
on the other hand, observed clearly specified rules of attire:
slacks or jeans were permitted only in the dorms, and shorts in
public were prohibited. Dresses and skirts were the rule for all
public appearances in the classroom or dining halls ( or walks to

the Seminary chapel in the months of January and. February!).
In the area of sports, women enjoyed relatively few outlets for
intercollegiate competition. Instead, their primary visibility
came as cheerleaders for the men, or, for the fortunate p·ret.ty
face, the membership in a "court" that would reign for one brief
moment during halftime of the annual homecoming basketball
game.
In less overt and unintentional ways the social discrimination spilled over into academic life. I have always felt that
Calvin's greatest legacy to me was the cultivation of a sense that
I was important, and that I was placed in this world to help
transform it. Nothing in my experience here encouraged me to
retreat-either to the home or to an other-worldly faith that
ignored the world around me. I'm not sure that same spirit of
public leadership and responsibility extended in. all its fullness
to women. They were, consciously or not, channeled into
"appropriate" vocations such as (primary or secondary)
teaching, nursing, or domestic careers as Christian wives and
mothers. Rarely would they be found in business, economics, or
engineering programs, nor were they actively "geared" toward
Ph.D. programs. These seemed to be understood primarily as
male prerogatives.

For me and most - of my friends, the gender-based stereotyping went largely unchalle'nged and taken-for-granted. The
standards appeared to work to our advantage, and it is only in
retrospect that I can appreciate the losses incurred. But the
women of Calvin were hardly silent or accepting of their role
definitions. Together with sympathetic faculty members they
lobbied tirelessly for change. They circulated petitions,
organized dorm meetings, and protested to_ anyone and
everyone who would hear. At every point they resisted disc-riminatory rules and circumvented official policies through
imaginative means, both fair and foul. Calvin women of the 60's
made it impossible for the school to blink its eyes to the inconsistencies; the rules would have to be remade.
The 'gradual .l iberation of women at Calvin has not, I am
happy to say, rendered us males obsolete. Instead I see an ease
and comaraderie between the sexes that simply did not exist
while I was a student, and that cannot help but work to the
benefit of men and women alike. Although it is fashionable to
lambast the apathetic 80's, I do not believe the changes I've
wifnessed have been for the worse. The Calvin I have come to
know in 198 l is a superior institution. It is not perfect (as any
good Calvinist could tell), but it is a better place to live, and to
learn. and to grow in the co11_1mon body of Christ.

J. Pieter Pereboom
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Buried deep in the footnotes at the
back of George Marsden's recent book
Fundamentalism and American Culture:
The Shaping of Twentieth Century
Evangelicalism, 1870-1925 is a glimpse of
the author's own history ·which
alongside his candid statement of point
of view in the Preface, serves to let the
reader in on the humanity of this work of
scholarship. The glimpse is of Middletown, Pennsylvania, where in the l 930's
his family experienced "social resentment
and petty ostracism" from established
society simply because the family had
joined the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church, then considered "fundamentalist." One often wonders what causes
children to grow up to write academic
works. Marsden gives us a fair answer,
"My own interests in the relationship of
fundamentalism to American culture undoubtedly arise from growing up in such
a setting" (p. 285). Indeed, Marsden
displays his concern for 1the preservation
of the integrity of religion in his academic
treatment of fundamentalism.
What sorts of notions come to one's
mind on hearing the word "fuqdamentalism"? Most probably, pictures of
tawdry, uneducated country
Christianity, Puritan moral standards,
the hard sell religious peddling of witnessing and personal testimonies, or
perhaps right-wing "Moral Majority"
conservatism. Yet, having initiated the
attempt with these tentative thoughts,
further progress·becomes difficult in face
of the complexities 9f fundamentalism.
For instance, we say fundamentalism is
the religion of the country bumpkin, but
how does that explain Wheaton College,

Geor!(e Marsden, a Calvin historian
and author, recentfv published a study of
Fundamentalism in America. For the
henefit of its readers, Dialogue here ·
offers the fallowing review summary by
Pieter Perehoom, and interview with the
author (conducted hy history and philosophy students Pieter Pereboom, Deb
Steenland, and David Yntema).
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which - enrolls more National Merit
students than any other school of its size?
· The task of defining fundamentalism is
central to Marsden's intricate study. His
definition: fundamentalism is "militantly
anti-modernist evangelical Protestantism." ·
. From the first bitter years of its
history, the white Protestant culture of
North America has dominated its
· surroundings. The strong lines _of control extend very clearly from the "shining
city on the hill" of John Winthrop to
that of Ronald Reagan. Yet at times this
dominance has seemed in danger of
collapse. The House Divided of the Civil
War and the divided houses of the I960's
are two notable examples. There have
been others. One of these was the retrogression of some American Protestants
within sixty years of the Civil War. As.
Marsden writes, "Respectable
'evangelicals' in the l 820's, by the l 920's
had become a laughing stock, ideological
strangers in their own land." The main
purpose of Marsden's book is to show
how this happened·.
Marsden structures his book on these
two components: the definition of funda mentalism and its development over the
half century from the l 870's to the l 920's.
Marsden proceeds to work these out
through the rest of his book. "Part One"
treats American Evangelicalism before
fundamentalism, "the dominant
religious force in American life." Yet
Protestant Evangelicalism was near to
fracture over two competing ·theologies
or philosophies: the well-established
Scottish Common Sense Realism and the
upstart Liberal theology which found its
impetus in German philosophy and
theology. The basic conflict in these
views, according to Marsden, is to be
found in varying views of truth and
consequent ramifications for faith,
science, the Bible, morality and civilization. Simply put, Common Sense
Realism was based on the assumption
that man's common experience of reality
is the way to truth. In this view science,
the Bible, man's morality, and faith all

have a purchase on the one truth and are
in agreement. Liberalism, as embodied in
the somewhat haphazard theology of
Henry Ward Beecher, held that truth is
more a matter "of the heart, sentiment,
'imagination' and 'sublimity'". It was in
vogue among literary elites, more a
faddish belief in the progression to the
ideal society than a rigid philosophy.
Human experience of progress was
thought to be the standard for religious
experience. It is easy to see why, despite
attempts to marry the two, the traditionalists adhering to Common Sense
and the "new theology" romantics had to
part ways.
At the same time, however, Dwight L.
Moody, in his revival campaigns, was
building a new evangelicalism that would
become the basis for fundamentalism.
His immediate goal was to win souls for
Christ, but important for the future
battles against culture was his ambivalence towards American culture. On
the one side he held that the world was a
"wrecked vessel" so that a Christian
civilization was hopeless. On the other
hand, Moody's evangelicism possessed a
deeply rooted faith in America itself, with
a fervent belief that God's redemptive
work would bring about moral progress
in society. Such ambivalence toward
America provides a central motif of the
entire study.
The subject of the second portion of
the book is the forming coalition of different and often contradictory forces.
This section is the triumph of the book in
its complexity and depth of analysis.
Marsden's discussion of the "mosaic of
divergent and sometimes contradictory
traditions ·a nd tendencies that could
never be totally integrated" obviously
cannot be replicated here, yet be assured
that these forces are closely explored in
the book.
The first topic which Marsden discusses is the development of premillennialist teachings into dispensationalist
thought, which, in turn, had an influence
on fundamentalist views of history and
society in · the church. The ragtag

conglomerate of Presbyterians and
Baptists, Calvinists and Arminians that
gathered under Moody's soul-saving
revival tent, while seemingly unified as
premillennialists, could agree on few
other doctrinal p9sitions. During the
1870's however, the strong doctrine of
Dispensationalism worked its way into
Evangelical circles to emerge as a
bulwark against the progressive faith of
Liberalism. Influenced by a Baconian
scientific prefereQce for precise
numerical systematization and founded
on belief in an inerrant Bible; Dispensationalism developed an amazingly
exact and detailed apocalyptic scheme
for history. History was seen as radically
different from the Liberal notion of
supernature working in human progress.
The doings of man .were almost completely subordinated to the rivalry of God
and Satan in predestined acts on earth.
The church on this scheme was totally at
the mercy of God and Satan as well. The
go·od (Protestant) church would be rapt
up into heaven before the tribulation,
while the bad (untrue Protestants,
Catholics, etc.) would be left to judgment and tribulation.' Society as well did
not contain any elements of a future
Kingdom but was bound to
degeneration. Despite their notion of
themselves as the one true church, these
premillernialists did not separate from
the larger Protestant denominations because they still saw s_alvation as individual not collective.

DANIEL AJD REVELATION
COMPARED

A second force that worked a great
effect on the fundamentalist movement
was the holiness movement. The major:
thrust of the movement was directed at
the individual and demanded an absolute
surrender to God-let the Holy Spirit in,
and then seek to bring the same to others.
It brought a certain spirit-filled optimism
to the fixed game of dispensationalism,
an optimism that expressed itself through
a zeal for mission work and social action.
Yet ultimately the victories were
conquests of personal souls, action was
always directed towards in9ividuals, not
institutions.
·
A further addition to the loosely
bound aggregate called fundamentalism
was · the doctrinal guide provided by
truths of common sense. In the numerous
preliminary skirmishes before the
twenties' debacle, fundamentalists and
most strong Northern Presby~erians
developed a body of propositions which
they would not yield to modernist
liberals. There were a number of
formulations, but, most importantly,
there developed a ·consensus among
evangelicals about what the fundamentals were.
Within this consensus there were a bewildering variety of views on _the relationship of Christianity to America. To
Marsden's mind, four clear positions are
discernible in this morass. The first
position was the premillennial view that
there was no good in American society.
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Man's only hope was Christ who would
return and establish the Kingdom; his
attempts at progress in socialism · or
democracy were futile. A second view
emphasized the signs of the times that
would lead to apocalypse, but without attacking democracy or socialism. Rew
taining optimism, proponents of this
view hoped that a great revival would
again occur to bring the nation back to
God. A third fundamentalist position
was propounded by William Jenni1,1gs
Bryan, a presidential candidate, secretary
of state under Wilson, and famous prosecutor in the 1925 Scopes trial. Bryan's
view was essentially that the ideals of
Christian piety went hand in hand with
the ideals of a progressing and
democratic American nation. A fourth
and decidedly minority view was one held
by Presbyterian B.B. Warfield and J.
Gresham Machen: culture ought to be
consecrated to God-transformed.
Machen here provides Marsden with the
key to the fate of fundamentalism in the
crucial years of conflict ahead. No one
saw more clearly than Machen that the
church needed to focus on the intellectual crisis and win that field.
In the third major part of the book
Marsden deals with what he calls the
crucial years of 1917 through 1925. Too
simply stated, the narrative runs like this:
In the war, fundamentalists abandoned
some of their ambivalence towards
s_ociety in favor of a super-patriotism that
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stood for all things good which were
Ar:perican, such as God, common sense,
and the Bible and against all things
German such as Liberalism, Jews and
Satan. Fundamentalists now had an
important stake in American civilization.
Their hopes for mankind were tied to the
future of America. The war had made
America especially belligerent. Now,
with the war over, it seemed as if the
people needed to find a new enemy. At
first, Bolshevism was the obvious villain.
Then the enemy moved closer to home in
the form · of German Liberalism and
Modernism's attacks on American institutions. Fundamentalists went to war on
two fronts against Liberalism within the
denominations a'nd Darwinism in
society. Both offensives failed. In the
church, sticklers for the fundamentals
could ilot enlist the aid of moderates ·in
censuring Liberalism. In society and in
the schools, action against Darwinism
floundered. This failure was epitomized
by the Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee.
A still-young mass media, flexing its newfound muscles, poured a flood of derision
on the medieval relic, William Jennings
Bryan.
.
· Marsden devotes the last p11rt of his
book to interpretations of fundamentalism. In this section Marsden
maintains that fundamentalism was primarily religious in character, as opposed
to the host of interpreters that would
brand it a social, intellectual, cultural or
political phenomenon. Marsden further
maintains that as a religious movement it

appealed in later years to displaced immigrants and those less equal in
equalitarian America. Politically, in the
post-war crises, the fundamentalist
movements became tied to the survival of
a Christian Bible-based civilization and
was often superpatriotic. Fundamentalists, outside of the establishment, often
saw themselves as the God party and all
others as the Satan party. Yet, they were
not simply anti-intellectualistic as often
supposed. The Common Sense
rationality in fundamentalism of Machen
and others was itself a species of intellectualism. Only when lesser lights attempted to defend the tradition did
bizarre and weird notions appear, as the
anti-intellectualism of a Billy Sunday.
Finally, Marsden sees fundamentalism as
a uniquely American phenomenon. It is
not something that can die out of
America easily, and it is still a force
today. Fundamentalism lies too close to
the heart of the American white
Protestant consensus to be rooted out.
For a book that aims to get at the guts
of a movement which is as broad as life,
Marsden manages to preserve a . high
degree of clarity in the narrative.
However, his claim to address the book
to both academics and thoughtful Christians seems a touch idealistic; the book
is very difficult. The strand of argument
is elusive as it dodges and weaves, as are
the technical analysis of Common Sense
Realism and Baconian Science. The
book is clearly suited to a scholarly
community.

Marsden: I think it's important to begin a historical study by
taking your subject seriously. And part of taking fundamentalists seriously is to start with what they say. It seems to me that
what people say about themselves is probably the best clue to
what they're up to. In most cases either they know what they're
doing, and they articulate this, or you can tell what they're
doing from what they've written. So that's where I start, and I
think that ends up being a lot less reductionistic than focusing
on some other dimension of their experience.
Now if I took a sociological tack, for instance, I could find
out that most fundamentalists were less rooted than other
groups. That tells me something interesting but it's really a hard
step to generalize from that to why people become
fundamentalists. It's not just because Lthey move. This fact does
help you, but once you know it, then what do you say?
Pereboom: In the preface of your book you write that "most of
history is too complex to be susceptible either to genuinely
comprehensive treatment or to definitive scientific analysis."
Don't you think you're giving up too much?
Marsden: Well, look, suppose you wanted to find out
something about the Dialogue staff. Now I think a better way to
do it would be to get a few perceptive people who were around
here a lot, and get some of their.insights into the dynamics of
this group. That would be more fruitful than confining yourself
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Scattered throughout the narrative, we
find small but important references to
Jonathan Edwards and Reinhold
Niebuhr. These two thinkers act as
· landmarks by which we can orient our
thoughts if we are "to distinguish God's
genuine work from practices that have no
greater authority than the customs or
ways of thinking of a particular time and
place" (p. 230). With · Edwards and
Niebuhr we have a touchstone from
which to set our new course.
There are other things that make the
book worthwhile·. The laughter that
Marsden elicits from his readers by his
witty turns of phrase is an important
counter to the laughingstock that is
fundamentalism in the person of W .J.
Bryan in 1925. Moreover, Marsden's
graphs and cartoons are not only a joy to
look at, but they explain fundamentalism
in a way that words never could. A
minor irritation-hardly worth notingis the publisher's decision to tuck the
footnotes away in the back of the book to
be seen only by fanatical page-flippers.
Marsden triumphs in this book. It is a
work of solid and insightful scholarship.
And it is more. In a sense,
Fundamentalism and American Culture
is an exhortation to Christian readers to
s i ft t h e c o m p l e x .t a n g l e o f
fundamentalism for viable elements, to
use this study to scrutinize the relationship of their own Christianity and their
culture. · Marsden, in his book, successfully combines his task as a scholar and as
a Christian.

to looking for characteristics of the staff that you could
demonstrate scientifically. You could demonstrate scientifically
a few things, like they are all between the ages of 15 and 30 and a
number of other traits, but there aren't all that many things you
can measure that reveal a whole lot of interesting information
about people. You can go a ways with that methodology, but it
seems to me that it's better to put the intuitive in the forefront
and use the scientific as scaffolding.
Yntema: You write that by identifying the observable cultural
forces a historian provides the material which helps people of
various theological persuasions to distinguish God's genuine
work from practices that have no greater authority than the
customs or ways of thinking of a particular time and place . How
do you do this considering that you too are locked in the culture
of a particular time and place? Don't you have to sort the gold
from the dross in your own time period before you can do it for .
another? Or isn't this as hard as it sounds?
Marsden: Yeah, I think that you do that all the time, and what
one has to be aware of is that one's perception is very often
shaped by one's cultural circumstances. One of the main tasks
of the historian, particularly the . intellectual historian, is to
identify those trends so you can have the possibility of at least
not getting caught up in some mind set of the age. But the fact
that your perceptior;is are shaped by things doesn't mean that

you don't sometimes get things right. For instance, I think I can
get it right that there.are four people in this room. And I think
that we can get some theological points right. Like, there are less
than 50 gods, or that Reverend Moon is not the Messiah, or a
half dozen other things.

while being modest about the hard ones and the things that you
don't know.
Yntema: Is this an easy case?
Marsden: Fundamentalism? No, it's a hard case. In certain
respects ....

Yntema: You have claimed before that it was wrong for the
Roman Catholic Church to initiate wars in medieval times for
the purpose of making money. How do ypu know with any<;ertainty that they were wrong? I mean, maybe it was God's idea
that they should make money that way.
Marsden: Well, identifying God's plan is difficult. But what you
can identify are certain features of it. Let's say, things that are
right and things that are wrong. Like, it's wrong to steal; now I
think that you can get that right. And you can tell the differenc.es between stealing and not. And if you do steal, you can
• say, "This might be;: in God's plan, but it's against God's will." As
far as God's plan is concerned, I think that that's something that
we'd best not comment on. But as far as his will is concerned,
there are some aspects of it he reveals to us, some things that
seem very, very clear-that we can know.
Yntema:. But can we separate his will from the culture?
Marsden: Well, I think that the wrongness of stealing is not a
culturally conditioned principle.
Steenland: But doesn't everyone share it regardless of their religious background?
Marsden: No, not everyone does. My v.iew is shaped by my
Protestant Calvinist upbringing. But I don't take my view to be
the worse for being shaped by cultural, familial experiences. So
is everyone else's. So why not? Why not say there's something
about God's relation to the world that we can know about, and
we can use this knowledge as some sort of criterion at least in
principle, of what we take to be right and wrong. So, most
· people think that the Holocaust is wrong. And I think that's
correct. Of course, you can always come up with lots ofhard
cases, but that should't stop you from taking up the easy cases,
while being modest about the hard ones and the things that you
don't know.

Yntema: Is th1s an easy one?
Marsden: Foundamentalism? No, it's a hard case.
Yntema: Why? What do you mean by fundamentalism anyway?
Because the fundamentalism you write about is not precisely the
same thing which is popularly termed fundamentalism today.
What are the differences, and why did the term come to have a
more narrow definition over the last two decades.
Marsd·en: It is different today. My definition of fundamentalism is "militantly anti-modernist, evangelical
Protestantism." I deal with that impulse within Protestantism
in America from the Civil War to the l 920's. What distinguishes
fundamentalism from other Protestants ·in that era-from just
evangelicals in general, Pietism, denominational conservatism,
or whatever-is its militancy against what they perceived as
modern theology and that theology's endorsing of modern
. culture. And that was a rather broad movement that affected
people in almost every evangelical denomination. Then, after
1925, fundamentalism · was pretty much in retreat. It
reorganized, and separated from the mainstream of American
culture. Some fundamentalists made separatism a tenet of the
faith. And then other fundamentalists, other people who were
all encompassed in this wide fundamentalist movement, began·
to want to get back into the mainstream of being American
evangelicals again. So there was a split into two parts: evangelicalism and separatist fundamentali~m. This started to happen
around 1940 or i;o. So today we have two movements growing
out of fundamentalism. One is a larger evangelical movement
associated today with Billy Graham and the other is a more
narrow movement associated with separatists such as Bob
Jones and Carl McIntire,
Now, ·today; what's happening; it seems to me, is that Jerry
Falwell and the like are maybe developing a new species of
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fundamentalism that moves back to the sort of thing we find in
the l 920's; that is, that they are relating the fundamentalist's
beliefs to a broad political coalition. They again have aspirations to transform the whole nation and they are going to ally
with Mormons and Roman Catholics, and so forth. And this is
the Moral · Majority. So that separatism, as a trait of fundamentalism, isn't all prominent right now. They are, then,
getting back to that other impulse-the impulse to run
America. And as I understand it, people are like Bob Jones are
quite upset with Falwell because he's making these
compromises; he's selling out in order to line up this moral
consensus, and thereby losing the purity of the fundamentalist
approach.2
Pereboom: A lot of the commentary on your book seems to take

"I think we can get some
theological points right.
but as far as God's plan is
concerned, I think that's
something we'd best not
comment on." ·
some comfort in the fact that you identify the basis of fundamentalism in religion. Do you think that's also true of the Moral
Majority-that they are motivated by religious factors?
Marsden: Yeah ....
Pereboom: And maybe you want to define religion while you're
at it.
Marsden: Maybe not.
(laughter]
Well, I think the key to my approach is to take
fundamentalists seriously, and I think that's what the commentators are liking about it. In a way, the model that I aspire to
is to do for fundamentalists something like-though not nearly
as well-what Perry Miller did for the Puritans. That is, Perry
Miller rehabilitated the Puritans by taking them seriously. And
to take someone seriously, is to take them seriously on their own
terms. And in the fundamentalists' terms, the religious commitment is central to what they're doing. Most of the books that
you read today on evangelical history, written, say, in the last
twenty to thirty years have a tendency to translate religious
factors into something else, and say, "Here's the real thing that's
going on." For instance, saying that Jonathan Edwards was
really worried about keeping up with his grandfather rather
than preaching, and forgetting about the fact that Jonathan
Edwards really believes what he's preaching. And that's the
tendency in writing the fundamentalist's history-to say "These
people are really worried about social, economic, political,
psychological things," and not to recognize that what they're
really worried.about is that people who don't believe the gospel
are going to end up in hell. And the best thing we can do for
people is to tell them about that. ·
Now, that's the starting point of analyzing someone like
Falwell too-to take him seriously on his own terms. The next
thing that you find is that religious impulse is mixed up with all
sorts of other impulses. It's mixed up with all sorts of anxieties.
And a central theme in the development of the movement is the
sense that America is somehow a Christian civilization and is
now gone to the devil. That's what they perceive, and that's very
alarming. It's partly sociological-White Anglo-Saxon
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Protestants are at the center of the fundamentalist movement,
and they're trying to preserve nineteenth century mores. And
it's mixed up with psychological, economic factors and the like.
So there are lots of dimensions to it.
Steenland: Do you have an explanation for the present
popularity of fundamentalism?
Marsden: That's a good question. I wish I had a good answer.
Actually there is some ·parallel to what happened in the first
fundamentalist era. In each instance there was a case of extreme
cultural anxiety with no very clear clue to what the source of the
problem was-or who the enemy was. This happened after
World War I and it's happening again. Fundamentalismgetting back to some lost fundamentals of a golden era-is
appealing at such times of crisis.
Steenland: Do you think that Vietnam and the counterculture
had anything to do with it?
Marsden: Well, what seems to have happened is that the
counterculture of the 1960's opened up people to taking religion
in general seriously. Twenty years ago-when I graduated
from college-to talk about religion was socially unacceptable.
Ten years ago it was completely the opposite problem-that
everybody was giving every religion a hearing.
And then in this atmosphere in the late 60's you get the
beginning of the evangelical resurgence: religion in general .was
growing, and evangelicalism revived. Then that revival
coincided with the reaction of Middle America to the whole
counterculture and the counterculture syndrome. And that
seems to be the leading edge of evangelicalism right now. Where
evangelicalism is used as a bludgeon to knock down anything
progressive. The whole enterprise is really a complicated thing
too, because so often people who are really dedicated Christians seem to be the most reactionary. Something a lot like this
happened in the early twentieth century too. In the Progressive
era, a theological reaction takes on a political conversativism.
Steenland: And if you add to it the middle class' present notion
of being economically oppressed-with high taxes and
inflation ...
Marsden: Yeah ....
Pereboom: And not only that but also the whole American

"Although ~round he.re we
talk a great deal about
being in the world, in fact,
it's the fundamentalists who
Rre doing things. We still
have horizons of Grand
Rapids and Pella ."
tradition of believing that we're the last hope of the world ...
Marsden: Yeah, El Salvador. ...
Pereboom: ... and here we are and what are we going to do
about it? We've got to get back to morality.
Marsden: Yeah, it's the strangest thing that there's this constant revival of the Puritan ideal of America as the chosen
nation, the new people of Israel, and the like. This is especially
strange when it comes from dispensationalists who are
supposed to believe that there is no Christian nation and no
kingdom of God on earth until Christ himself returns. Falwell,
for instance, is a dispensationalist of sorts, who seems to say
that the problems won't be resolved until Christ comes again.

Until then· we're supposed to be just spiritual. At least that's
what fundamentalists are often accused of-of being too individualistic, spiritua.Jistic, otherworldly, and the like. And now, ·
low and behold, the fundamentalists are doingjust the opposite.
They're saying we ought to get involved with politics and take
responsibility for society.
This is then the paradox that has been evident the whole way
through-that there has been a two-fold vision of America:
America is Israel, or America is Babylon. And you can find
both in the same sermon. You'll hear America is. condemned
and will be blown up; Christ will condemn America for her sins;
and you'll year very graphic descriptions of these sins and what ·
will happen. The next thing you know, America is going to save
the world. People talk about increasing the defense budget so we can keep the Russians · out of here. So it's really a very
curious ambi•valence and that's what I see as having happened
historically. There are these two poles and in the nineteenth
century they're at the height of their influence, when American
culture was evangelical to a large extent. But by 1925, they're
the laughing stock of the culture.
Yntema: Right. You have this quote here from H.L. Mencken:
"Christendom may be defined briefly as that part of the world
where if any man stands up in public and solemnly swears that
he is Christian, all his auditors will laugh."
Marsden: There's the part where they are the outsiders. Either
you're running the nation and it's Jerusalem, or you're an
outsider and it's a condemned Babylon. And fundamentalists
play it both ways.
Pereboom: But these visions of America have always been
selective in who they include. For instance, fundamentalism has
always meant White, Anglo-Saxon Protestants despite a large
sector of Black Christians in America. This points to forces that
aren't specifically religious in fundamentalism, doesn't it?
Marsden: What I was just
saying is an illustration of that.
Cultural experience has a lot to
do with how you read the
_B ible-for instance, what in the
Bible do you find most helpful,
the Old Testament or the New
Testament? Old Testament
people are building a kingdom,
and New Testament people are
being ~piritual and waiting for
Christ to return. It's determined to a large extent by your
attitude toward your culture.
One analogy I use which comes
out of my experience at Calvin
is ' that of fundamentalist's experience as analogous to immigrant experience. 'It seems to me
that the experience of being displaced, - and finding your
cultural values -at odds with
those of the dominant culture,
is to some extent what
happened to White ~ngloSaxon Protestants at the turn of the century. They grew up
with ·certain values and found themselves later on living by
those same values, but people laughed at them. One of the responses to that was to build walls. To see everything with what
Richard Hofstadter called a Manichean view of reality-everything is black or white with no grey areas. All of which is to say
that Christianity is at the root of it, but the Christianity is
shaped by cultural experiences. And then the trick is to separate
the real Christianity out of the cultural inheritance. And that's

what I think any Christian has to do in order to take a group like
this seriously.
Steenland: Would you say that a certain amount of flexibility is
something that fundamentalism and Calvinism both lack?
Marsden: Well, yeah, they often have lacked flexibility. For one
thing, Calvinism and fundamentalism are rather close to each
· other. Originally, much of fundamentalism grew out of
Calvinism, although, now the lines of direct connection are
often rather thin. The intellectual aspect of Calvinism reinforces the idea of drawing sharp lines between right and
wrong. There are · a lot 9f affinities between Christian Reformed people and fundamentalists. In fact, during the 1920's
and l 930's when fundamentalism was a broader movement
than it is today, and when it included the Princeton theological
tradition, there were lots of connections between that type of
fundamentalism and the CRC-for instance at Westminster
Theological Seminary. These connections were strong at Calvin
until the crisis of the early l 950's, which set the present direction
for Calvin.
Since then the Calvin community has developed to a large
extent in reaction to fundamentalism. The biggest influence of
fundamentalism around here has been people trying not to be
like fundamentalists. Whereas, fundamentalists tend to
emphasize theology, by now it's very difficult to find any
theology spoken of at Calvin. And, whereas fundamentalists
talk a lot about the Bible, it's difficult to find talk about the
Bible at Calvin. It comes up in some courses, but it is not likely
to be the dominent aspect of the outlook. Again, whereas with
fundamentalism, there's that very strong emphasis on personal
piety, here there's a sort of suspicion about that. I think there's a
strong anti-fundamentalist impetus at work here.
Pereboom: Part of it too seems to be that the second generation
feel~ a little bit embarrassed about their parents. The makers

and shakers of Calvin are second generation, or once removed
from fundamentalism, and they want to distance themselves
from it.
Marsden: Yeah, weil that's putting a couple of things together.
One is that much of the Americanization that has taken place in
the Christian Reformed Church has some fundamentalist traits.
So, lots of people listen to WMBI in Chicago ....
Steenland: What's that?
Marsden: It's the Moody Bible Institute Christian radio station.
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There's something American that's safe in this fundamentalist
religion, and that's what people embrace as they Americanize.
So there are strong actual inroads of fundamentalism in our
culture.
Steenland: Do you think the growing popularity of
fundamentalism now is any threat to Calvin College? Say, if
there were a huge influx .. .
Marsden: Well, it's a double threat. One is that Calvin might be
bought by some fundamentalist-leaning person, but it also
might be taken over by a reaction to it. We need a balance to
somehow retain the positive elements in both. But that's difficult to do because there's another thirig around here which is
very strong and that is folk r~ligion or Dutch folk religion. The
requirements are that you behave in a certain way, that you
don't do certain things. It really doesn't matter that much what
you believe or what you do, as long as you conform to certain
symbolic moral standards. The emphasis is on what you don't
do.
Group: No dirty words, against abortion, sleep around but
don't get caught, rather hypocritical. ..
Marsden: Well, I should say that that is not unique to this
community. I should say some things too about the strength of
this community. I really think that this community has tremen-

dous possibliities for leadership in the American Christian community today. Despite its differences with fundamentalism, it's
still within the evangelical camp. But we're almost unknown by
the evangelicals. Although around here we talk a great deal
about being in the world, in fact, it's the fundamentalists who
are doing things. We still have horizons of Grand Rapids and
Pella. So we don't really mobilize the wonderful potential that's
available here. And the things that people do get excited about
are these folk religion things. If you want to get somebody really
mad in this community, say something about folk religions. But
let it be racism, or missions, or. ...
Pereboom: So you think we ought to improve relations with the
fundamentalists?
Marsden: Yeah, right. We have something to offer
fundamentalists, and they have something to offer us. They
have to offer us a spiritually motivated enthusiasm which is
something we greatly distrust. And, we should put that together
with the sorts of theories that we have and they need. We have
Reformed Christianity on the books a lot better than many people. But, we have to ask ourselves what our goal is in the last two
decades of the twentieth century. We're not going to get very far
by posing as the last word of Christianity. It's much better to be
a little modest.
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Rick Beerhorst

The CRC, South Africa and.

THE HERESY OF
APARTHEID
Allan Boesak
Two years ago, I wrote an article on the relationships between
the white Dutch Reformed Church and the three black DR
churches (the mainly "coloured" Sendingkerk, the African
DRC in Africa and the "Indian" Reformed Church in Africa).
The article concluded with four observations:
I.

"If the White NGK (Nedrduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, i.e.
"Dutch Refarmed Church") continues it critical support of
the white gove'rnment, the situation will become very difficult, if not impossible. The continued relationships of the ·
black churche~ with the most powerful of all apartheid
churches are already undermining the integrity of the black
churches in their own community."

2.

"It is clear that on basic important matters·, the gulf between
the white NGK and the three black churches is widening.
The white church, so the Dutch delegation which was here
in January of this year (1978) was told, still maintains
apartheid (and therefore white baasskap) as the will of God
for South Africa. Blacks can never, will never, concede this
and must flatly refuse any attempt to compromise their
.God-given human dignity. If the NGK remains adamant,
however, the painful question arises for the black churches:
how long?
.

3.

"How will the NGK accomodate the very definite desire on
the part of many in the black churches to become one,
united Reformed church? If no satisfactory response is
forthcoming, the black churches will almost be forced to go
it alone, opening the doors to all who .wish to join."

4.

"The next year or two that lie ahead will prove crucial for
the whole DR Church family. If the white church persists
on its road of isolation, if it continues to develop its
theology within the framework of a raciaf ideology, if it ·
continues to prove unable to make a practical contribution
towards meaningful change in this country, the question
remains: how long? This is not to say that a break will occur
soon or .even that it is inevitable. It does mean, however,
· that the tension between these churches will become un·-:bearable."

That was two years ago. Much has happened since then and
for a growing number of people in the black Reformed
churches, the answer to the question "how long?" has become a

Dr. Allan Boesak is a noted South African theologian who is
currently teaching at Calvin .on a one-year appointment as
Multi-Cultural lecturer.

painful, but definite, "no longe.r ."
The "big moments" in the deterioration of relationships can
be pin-pointed fairly easily. First there was the Sendingkerk
synod in 1978 which broke its long silence on apartheid by
denouncing it as "irreconcilable with the Gospel." We said farewell to apartheid in the church and chose for total unification
with the other NG churches. The white church, on the other
hand, affirmed its stand on apartheid and its biblical basis and
rejected the call for union with the black churches on racial
grounds.
Secondly, the two top-level meetings between the white NGK
and the black churches revealed a still .widening rift on almost
all major issues facing the church in South Africa today.
Thirdly, it was revealed last year that the white NGK has
allowed the now defunct department of information to use its
ecumenical contacts with overseas churches as a propaganda
channel for the white government. This was bad enough, but the
quite shameless cover-up of this indefensible action by the white
church .authorities has had a devastating effect on the image of
the white church in our community-inasmuch as that fmage
still meant anything at all.
Fourthly, there was the publication of two books which
showed beyond doubt how important the white Afrikaans
churches are to the Afrikaner Broederbond and vice versa. We.
also began to understand the consequences this relationship
has always had for the black churches.
But all this has happened within a white context, so to speak.
Even more has happened within the black community. The
growing political consciousness and, indeed, radicalization, has
had a profound influence on the black churches. Not only is
there growing understanding of our own situation, but also a
much better understanding of the role of the white church and
of whites within the church itself, vis a vis our situation. Black
ministers now have an acute sense of awareness and ·of
accountability and of responsibility to the black community, so
that whether white people are "satisfied" with us is no longer
important at all. Also, and, most important, blacks know that
to acquiesce in this situation of oppression would be an act of
unfaithfulness and disobedience to the Gospel of Jesus Christ
they are called to proclaim.
And then, of course, there were the months of unrest in the
Western Cape and there was Elsies River, the name that now ·
carries _the same symbolic meaning that Soweto carried since
1976. During the unrest "the coloured community" matured
with incredible intensity, and there was no way that the church
could avoid being .involved , and this meant, irrevocably,
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growing confrontation with the state and the supporters of the
government, in casu the white NGK. And now, for the first
time, people are openly talking about a split in the NGK family
as being "inevitible."
During the unrest, an informal delegation of the Sendingkerk
went to see representatives of the white church to discuss the
current crisis and the church's response. They shared with the
white church the following insights:

1.

The conviction that the root cause of the unrest is the
government's policy of apartheid;

2.

As apartheid is a policy initially devised hv the white NGK
and, once taken over by the government, given moral
justification by the NGK, the white church is ·a s responsible as the government for the chaos, alienation, bitterness and suffering this policy causes. After
all, it was an Afrikaner
churchman who in May of
this year confirmed this
when he stated that "after.
1948, it was not necessary
for the [white] NGK to
make olitical pronouncements.
.because the
government was faithfully
executing apartheid-the
NGK's own creation .... ";

3.

4.

The price we are paying for
apartheid-fear, distrust,
hatred, suffering, escalating violence and especially
the blood of innocent
children~is too high. No
one who believes ·in the
Gospel of Jesus Christ
could be party to this any
more;

r ~ . ,'

When one has formulated an ideology, plotted and planned
and cajoled for decades to have it accepted as government
policy; when you have provided theological and moral justification for that policy in spite of the injustices, the suffering and
the violence about which you knew; when you have done to
others (in the name of Christian love at that!) what you never
would have accepted yourself; and when the nation's children
are dying on the streets because of this policy, mercilessly shot
down because they dared to
protest for the sake of their
future, then it is simply not
enough to say, "Come, let us
worship together. .. "
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DECEIVED
I know there are people who
say that this is a "step" forward," · an important concesf
-·
sion. But these people are deceiving themselves.and they are
being deceived by those blacks
who say what whites want to
hear (Yes, we ·still have those
around!) They are being
deceived by those whites who
know blacks so well that they
.w,,.-·
, . ' •• can
take it upon themselves to
,.
make pronouncements about
our innermost feelings. Did not
,
an Afrikaans daily describe the
white Moderator of the
Sendingkerk as an "expert" on
"coloureds"? This we can no
longer take.
And herein lies the tragedy.
For if it should come to a break
with the white NGK the painful
thing is that, for most of us, .
Dr. Allan Boesak there is no relationship to break
really. We share preciously
little; we don't worship together, or live together, so we don't
know each other. We differ deeply on the most fundamental
Reformed princip_les. Their white sons they send to work in the
black church have, with a few notable exceptions, not identified
with the black church; they remain strangers, Nationalists who
-defend and promote the interest of their volk in our church over
the years causing our church to lose its credibility with the
people it is called to serve, The white NGK believes in apartheid;
we believe it is heresy and an everlasting shame to the history of
the Christian Church.
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On the basis of this, the
white church was asked
publicly to denounce its
support of the policy of photo by deJong
apartheid and to exhort the
government to seek the cooperation of all people to create a
new dispensation for our country to secure peace.

Given the situation, I found the attitudes of the white representatives shocking and their response beyond belief. A
subsequent leading article· in the Kerkbode rejected the
suggestions out of hand. In fact, during these months that Cape
Town was seething and bleeding with protest, all the white
church could say was to praise the police for their restraint. But .
through it all, their support for apartheid remained unchanged.
And it is this fact, more than anything else which has brought us
to the breaking point. For apartheid, being what it is, has not
only to do with political peace and economic justice. It has to do
with the integrity of the Gospel.
INEVITABLE FRUITS
People should be clear about this. The crux of the matter is
. not the NGK's stand on mixed marriag~s or mixed worship.
These are merely the inevitable fruits of the system and the
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result of the NGK's uncritical support of the ideology underlying apartheid. People who think that twenty-three anonymous white Dutch Reformed ministers who plead for "mixed
worship" in white churches are "showing signs of a new movement in the NGK" are amazingly out of touch with both the
NGK arid the black churches.
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MONEY
There is really only one thing that constitutes our relationship: the money they give "for mission." Quite apart from the
fact that this has everything to do with the economic injustice in
this country which they themselves helped create and maintain,
is this really a viable foundation for an authentic relationship
between churches? And it is sad, but true: Many black
Reformed people think of the white NGK not as a church in the
first place, but rather as a bastion of white survival, an indis-

pensable pillar of the system; the spiritual "place of rest" for the
oppressor; the place where he comes to hear on Sunday that
whatever he has done during the week has God's approval.
But sadder still, we cannot really believe that the white church
is capable of changing. It seems that too much is at stake for
.people who believe that only in the hands of the Afrikaner is
South Africa safe. The NGK is too much of a volkskerk, too
important an institution for the party, too accurate a reflection
of the state of Afrikanerdom. If the church should change, it
would split in itself. Then the Party will split, the Afrikaner
academic world will split, the young people will be confused
and, worse, become preys to the ever-hungry "liberals.- " It will
be, I fear, a ve~itable volkskeuring, something, as Andre du Toit
so correctly pointed out, that Afrikaners verkramptes and
verligtes alike, want desperately to avoid. That, after all is said
and done, is really the "alternative too ghastly to contemplate."
PROBLEMS
It would be naive to think that a split with the NGK will not
bring problems for the black church-especially financial
problems. But these problems will at least offer the opportunity to tackle them creatively, on our own terms. And all the
time and energy put into fruitless and frustrating discussions
could be used to build a church more in accord with the needs of
the black community. •
So the final question is: Will the white NGK be church and
rise up to the challenging that that brings, or will it ·choose to remain merely an important factor in the lotgevalle van die volk?
The question, many feel , has already been answered. And there
i~ blood on the ground to prove it.

•

The article above is an editorial reprinted from the 1980
second/ third quarter edition of Dunamis, a Christian Quarter. ly of South Africa edited by Dr. Allan Boesak. What follows is
his statement of this editoria/'s relevance for Norrh American
churches-particularly the Christian Reformed Church.
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Christians, churches and Christian institutions in ·North
America cannot ignore any of this as they seek to become involved with the situation in South Africa. They, too, cannot
. avoid the painful decisions that will have to be made. But it is
just as well that there is no misunderstanding about all of this.
There is no more room for the kind of bland neutrality that
wants to "help" the oppressed · whilst "understanding" the
oppressor. There is no room for the innocent arrogance with
which Christians in Europe and North America wanted to be
the mediators, bringing reconciliation between blacks and
whites in South Africa. Their complicity in our South African
situation is too clear; they have profitted too much from our
oppression. They too need repentance which can only be
expressed in acts of genuine solidarity with the oppressed. All of
which means that in their involvement in the South African
situation they must, perhaps for the first time, learn to listen to
the oppressed themselves, to accept our guidance and to
support us in what we are trying to do to secure our liberation. It
means that they must learn to take us seriously when we say that

it is not possible to work for justice and liberation in South
Africa if they are not at the same time totally and uncompromisingly committed to these same goals here in the United
States. Black South Africa cannot and will not merely be an
escape from that responsibility here. We know that it is the
commitment to justice, peace and reconciliation here that
authenticates American Christians' involvement with our
struggle in South Africa.
There are some other considerations. Perhaps these decisions
will be harder for the Christian Reformed Church than for any
other denomination. In many ways, their relationship with
white South Africa has been different. Not so long ago, the Rev.
Tymen Hofman wrote in the Banner about the "unique position" of the CRC to help the South African churches. The CRC,
he says, has witnessed for'racial equality and in so doing did not
alienate the white churches. He also reports that a white NGK
leader had told him: "We desperately need the Christian
Reformed Church. You can help us because you are not .
compromised by World Council membership nor doctrinal
deviation."
.
,
With regard to these assertions, we must now ask some questions that we have asked once before. If support of the apartheid
system in South Africa and all that that means, not protesting
the killing of children, using the Gospel to justify this
oppression is not heresy, a denial of the Word and a betrayal of
the R·e formed. tradition, then what is? And if it is, why then has
this not alienated the Christian Reformed Church from the
white DRC? The churches in the Netherlands have taken their
stand, difficult as it is, alongside the oppressed people of our
land, expressing this is not only in words but also in their
support for the Programme · to Combat Racism. Black
Reformed Christians in South Africa thank God for their
courage and their support. We must ask what has the CRC
done?
Secondly, we in the black churches have been ·pleading with·
the whites for ·m any years now. We want to forgive and begin
again. We want to offer them genuine reconciliation and fellowship renewed by Christ whicl} come only through confrontation
with evil and sharing of the pttin. They still reject this. Why do
they "desperately need" the CRC? Is it because the Christian
Reformed Church is seen to be another white church? Is it
because the CRC will be more "understanding" than the Dutch?
Because the CRC is farther away than the blacks? Or is it because the white Dutch Reformed people in South Africa hope
that when it comes to the CRC, the voice of kinship, the voice of
blood, the voice of empty orthodoxy, will speak louder than the
.voice of the Gospel? These are hard, painful questions, but they
are honest, and our oppressed people have the right to ask them.
Our pain is too deep; our suffering too real; the death of our
children too final.
.All of this is not easy. We may need a miracle. But a miracle is
not some magic act in which the divine hand is simply quicker
than the human eye. It is act through which the Spirit of God
enables us to reach beyond ourselves, beyond our
possibilities and limitations, beyond our ken, to perform an act
of solidarity, love and obedience. To our own surprise, and
· to his glory.
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A Psychology Colloquium: the state of the art.

Lucasse: Dialogue has used colloquiums in past issues to
acquaint students with the present standing and questions
within various disciplines. This dis:ussion will, of course, be informal, but I hope that . we can touch on many elements in
psychology today. Perhaps the best place to start is, "What is
psychology?"
Joosse: This might seem like a rather stiff way to begin, but
almost every 151 text begins by saying that psychology is "the
scient{fic study of human behavior or the behavior of
organis·ms." That's the conventional definition. Is that adequate?
Lucasse: When you say organisms, does that mean animals
too, then?
Joosse: Yeah, that would include animals. A lot of psychological research has been done on animals, though I think most
psychologists would say that humans are the pri·m ary interest.
The goal is to understand behavior in simple organisms so that
we can discern similar principles or more complex ones in
humans. Now, one of the key words in that definition is
scientific, a major emphasis in the discipline of psychology. I
suspect that might be where some of our differences come inwhether psychology should be a science and, if it is science, what
type it ought to be.
Cooper: This is still very vague: human behavior includes the
entirety of active human existence, by definition: so all of
religion, everything that's been done by anyone in history, all
the people who are in any possible human situation where
they're not simply passive and even passivity itself, all that is
now the object of psychology.
Lucasse: Do psychologists in fact, try to study every aspect of
human behavior?
Joosse: "Observable" behavior? Is that a word that you'.d like in
your definition, Bill?
Cooper: And by behavior do you mean what I would call
"mental events"?
Sanderson: Yes, but thinking is activity.
Cooper: I can't equate thinking with the activity of neurons. But
whatever, you mean external behavior.
Sanderson: But you're talking about the activity of neurons.
See, I think activity involves · an interaction, involves something you can see-like a guy picks up a coffee cup.
Cooper: So it's external behavior.
Sanderson: Not totally external, because it may have these
external components. But still, the focus of our attention is on
real human beings interacting with the real world. Not somebody sitting there with his eyes clos~d. That might be
important. ..
Cooper: Look, I do that (sitting and thinking) all the time, and I ·
think it's psychologically very interesting. Maybe what you
mean by interacting is kinesis. I would have to move, but then I
would also have to have mental. ...
Partic,jwnts in this colloquium on the state of the discipline of
psycholog1· 11 ·ere Professor John Cooper of the philosophy def)artment and Professors Wa_me Joosse, William Sanderson
and Mari · VanderGoot of the ps_l'cho/ogy department . The discussion 11·as mediated hy Mary Lucasse.
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· Sanderson: No, you'd have to start writing or talking. I'm not
saying that it's not important-what you're doing. But I'm
afraid it's subject matter for some other science.
Cooper: Now that's what I wanted to get at. Because then you
and I can start defining behavior. For you, it's publicly observable.
Sanderson: At a certain level. Because I c;ilso think we could
usually infer what is going on in your head, but we have to infer
it from observation of your acts, or your behavior or your
adaptive activity.
Cooper: I don't know if that's right I don't think that I infer
very much from other people's acts at all-if by that you mean
some sort of explicit mental calculation or chain of reasoning. I
see that somebody is troubled; I see that someone is sad; I see
that somebody's thinking.
Sanderson: You're saying that the man on the street doesn't
carefully analyze. It almost sounds like what Helmholtz called
an unconscious inference.
Cooper: Yes, right. But I'm not sure what the logical status of an
"unconscious inference" is. Maybe there aren't such things.
Sanderson: It sounds to me like you're more empirical than I
am.
Cooper: No, I would like to say that there's plenty of room in
psychology for inference, but you wanted to talk about
evidence, and now you're saying, "Well, the guy's really
thinking, but he doesn't know what he's thinking." I think that's
a matter of recognition.
Sanderson: Well, I could agree with that. I said it was an
inference-a hypothesized process.
Cooper: But, if that sort of inference is in the ballpark, then all
these so-called inner states or mental events or non-observable
behavior, as you put it-the other tip of the external icebergare just as much fair game for psychology.
Sanderson: It seems to me there's room for hypothesizing
events within the mind or brain, as long as we start with a base
that has empirical content.
Cooper: Okay, but do we have to do that exclusively from the

"Christian academics in
other disciplines have great
suspicions of psychology."
third person point of view?/ don't have to infer that/ am thinking.
Sanderson: Well, I would probably say psychology is the
empirical study of adaptive activity. That doesn't help too
· much, except it involves interactions with the environment
which in the long run or in general are adaptive.
Cooper: Okay, but suppose I want to specify that somehow.
· Even God is part of the environment in a broad sense. He sets
conditions for human action. But in that kind of view,
psychology is really the basic science. All possible kinds of
human experience, religion, mathematics or philosophy, are
then simply subcategories of psychology. And I think that is a
presumptuous definition. I'm very puzzled as to what the
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broader object of psychology is, frankly. Maybe a way to see it
would be to look at different schools of psychology and at what
different psychologists actually say, rather than to find a
definition a priori. And then I think you're going to come up
with a broad range of things but by no means a range of things
which would justify the sort of general definition given.
It may be that there's another question involved. Is whatever
any psychologist does automatically psychology? In other
words, I suspect according to certain definitions of psychology,
for instance whatever the Marxists do just isn't psychology. I
mean, according to one definition, they're doing something else.
VanderG~~t: In this matterof definition, for me the usefulthing
is to ask myself, how do I choose to differ with the definition
already given. I define psychology as "the systematic investigation ofhuman action." By systematic investigation, I don't
mean randomly looking at what someone does, and describing
it. But systematic investigation means using a method whose
procedures are clear. And with that assumption, I'll include the
. Marxist whose method is not like Il!ine, but whos~ method is
clear..And it suffices _to create a community of scholarship that
approaches the .subject matter consistently. I prefer to talk
about human action rather than behavior because psychology
seems to study most often the process involved on the active
subject side of human experience and iooks less .closely at the
object. For example, the psychologist may study how it is that
people seem to use language without studying language itself
directly. Or the psychologist may look at how people process information systems without looking at logical systems per se as
philosophy does. So I think that a psychologist focuses on the
action side; he focuses on the person who performs the act. He
asks how it is possible that a person can perform this action.
Cooper: Then it would
more the variety, kinds of action and
motivating and conditioning factors which enver into the
performing of the action itself, rather than, say, the formal
structure of that process. Philqsophy tries to identify this trans- ·
cendental or formal structure of action in general as kind of
action. The psychologist looks at the empirical details of actions
·and situations of actions. I am sympathetic with what'you said,
but I would still say that there should be some distinction
between psychology and philosophy. Maybe they do blend into
one another. But according to your definition, it seems that
philosophy would be swallowed, and that philo~ophical
consideration is the very same thing as psycholo•gical.
VanderGoot: I think it's possible that philosophy has become
part psychology. We certainly must allow for the fact that disciplines overlap. If psychology and philosophy are different, I
think it is in that psychology tends to be more person-centered·
than philosophy.
·
Sanderson: It may be that the present method of empirical observation is one of the things that narrowly defines psychology.
Cooper: Well, I'm not so sure how you would draw those lin~s
either because I think that what I do as a philosopher is
empirically grounded. I can't do it without reflecting on
experience.
Sanderson: Well, I was struck by this the other day as I was
reading about Wundt again. Wundt was developing an experimental psycholo_gy independent of philosophy, and then-this

is the thing that surpdsed me-when it actually came to setting
up his laboratory, he deliberately insisted on pursuing research
in areas which had already been more or less defined. In other
words, it appears he began with something with which he could
make a clear start. Nothing really new or surprising emerged;
but there was 3:n attemp_t to build a narrow base for more in.elusive kinds of study.
Cooper: Wasn't he someone who was defining empirical in such
a way that introspection could be a legitimate methodology?
Sanderson: That was a part of the general program. Nothing
that anyone has said here has contradicted that. . .
Cooper: No, but in general, I'm tryin~ to ~et a better idea_ of
what you mean by the study of human behavior, or the behavior
of organisms in an empirical way, as opposed to a nonempirical way. I'm just not sure where I can put .the knife
between the bone and the muscle on that particular question.
V_anderGoot: Well~ empirical often refers to one's own point of
v_iew, and speculative to other persons'.
. . . [laughter] .
~anderson: Empi~ical is m_ore closely tied to concrete o~servat10n. Now,_rou I?~ght,,n~t h_ke the_word concrete, but I t~mk the
ess~nce of empmcal hes m relymg on actual ?bservat10n and
?omg so m the actua~ concr~t~ context of our hves;_psychol~gy
is _the st1;1dy of adaptive activity, we obser:ve organisms copmg
with their actual world.
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. VanderGoot: Well'; we don't observe the adaptation, we observe

some kind of action which we interpret as adaptive. But what
strikes me, in itself, as not being empirical since the concept
"adaption" doesn't present itself through the senses. It's rather
some kind of a grid that you use for giving meaning to and
offering an explanation of some event.
Sanderson: But that in itself is actualized from observation.
VanderGoot: But then almost any concept in psychology has a
reference to something in experience. There are very few ideas
that are purely psychological.
.
Joosse: At some point we have to ask what this will mean to
Dialogue readers. Implicit in these definitions are responses to
all kinds of complex issues. And although we are never going to
agree on a definition, we could probably clarify some other
issue and,'at the end, come back to a definition. Unless you want
to continue ·to hammer away on a definition of psychology.
Lucasse: How would you think psychology should be done?
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What should be the methodology?
Sanderson:what broad questions! You almost have to answer
. historically-how have psychologists done it.
Joosse:well, let's go back; remember the definitions? At least
the textbooks think that scientific is a very crucial adjective.
tyf ost psychologists are very preoccupied with being scientific.
Historically, psychology is perhaps one hundred years old. It
· was a runoff from philosophy; it rather self-consciously wanted
to be a science and adopted scientific methodology-primarily
borrowed from the natural sciences. To this day that kind of
commitment dominates mainstream psychology. The tensions
in the discipline come from how people assess the evolution of
the discipline. The commitment to being scientific-whatever
that means-and particulary the borrowed tools, that's where
we can focus. We all agree on the historical course of events, do
we not?
Lucasse:It would be interesting if you would give a historical
rundown. In fact, what have been the main historical trends?
Where did it start? In philosophy you said, but why did it turn
empirical?
Joosse: well, someone once said that psychology has a short
history, but a long past. In some sense psychology is one of the
newer disciplines, but obviously people have been concerned
about human behavior for hundreds of years. I imagine Adam
said to Eve; "Why did that kid of ours do that to the other oner' ·
So people have always been trying to understand human
behavior, but as Bill would say, in speculative ways, not in
systematic ways.
VanderGoot:There is another ~ay to understand the rise of
psychology. Psychology was originally developed to answer the
questions that philosophers had dealt with. In the development
of modern science there is a preoccupation with how we can
acquire certainty. As psychology developed in the nineteenth
century there was a special focus on the psychology of knowledge. Nineteenth century psychology tried to explore the
interface between the-senses and ideas. There are events in the
outer world which we receive without senses and about which
we have ideas; how can we understand.the relationship between
ideas and those sensory events? Nineteenth century
psychologists thought that you try to get as close as you can to
this minute interface where somehow senses turn into ideas.
Psychology itself was a new attack on a philosophical problem.
It's not that psychology found a new object and used philosophical methods, but it was that psychology offered a new
method for looking at old philosophical problems.
Freud was concerned with similar problems. He was more
concerned with how you can trust your perceptions and how
you can distinguish truth from deception-and various tricks
that the mind plays on itself for whater psychic reasons. And
so Freud chose not to study the processes of the senses, but
instead to study consciousness and its various -levels or .
organization. He turned towards consciousness not because he
saw it as the object of a new discipline of psychology, but because he thought that a new way of looking at old problems
might solve them.
·
But what happened in the twentieth century is not so much .
the continuation of that tradition, as I understand it, but a
breaking with that tradition. Continental psychology is
consciously philosophical and defines itself along traditional
lines of thinking. But American psychology is different because
American psychologists received their training in North
America and at a time when the idea of progress was very important. To Americans this Continental psychology seemed so
useless-irrelevant. American psychology maintains a
technological side; its method is adapted to a technology, a
technology that fits into the American dream of progress. And
that fits well with the notion that if you observe behavior, and if ·
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you can predict behavior, then you can control it. It is better.to
be the one doing the controlling then the one who is controlled,
because your chances of survival are better. I think that
American psychology is hard to understand against a background of European psychology unless it is understood as a
reaction to European psychology. But here again, every
psychologist has a different understanding of the history of the
discipline, and certainly not everyone agrees.
Cooper:rve always tended to think of psychology as continu-

"Any notion of objectivity
becomes preposterous.
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not like the 19th century person, in part, because of
psychology."
ing to ask, with the different methodology, the basic question of
Socrates, "What is man?" It's an attempt at human selfknowledge in a certain way. It became especially acute in
Western civilization after Biblical Revelation was rejected as a
valid source of the definition of man. Then, in Enlightenment
philosophy, there were all kinds of renewed attempts to define
man primarily as a rational being, as a moral agent and the like,
which raised a lot of metaphysical problems. But psychology
itself arises in the nineteenth century along with a number of
empirical sciences. It's not just scientific psychology which is
important in the nineteenth century; but medicine; and in many
ways physics, chemistry, and biology really get their recognizable contemporary form in the nineteenth century. All of a
sudden, along the frontier of human knowledge all sorts of
lights are going on whe11 a certain kind of method is applied.
And that occurred about the time that Hegelian and other
forms of speculative idealism and romanticism were beginning
to flag, at least in Europe. A lot of attention is then turned to the
very same questions about man from the point of view of the
new scientific methodology. Psychology capitulated to
naturalism-the Hegelian view that everything is one great big
quasi-organic system was deflated into the view that everything
is one big organism-from Hegel to Darwin is a very short step,
and all you have to do is change the metaphysical substance of
which reality consists from Spirit to nature to arrive at scientific ·naturalism. On the other hand, there were people in Europe
who were not willing to give up the idea that man is somewhat
spiritual, rational, autonomous, and creative in ways which
could not be metaphysically true if naturalism were true; these
individuals wanted to hang onto a humanistic view of mankind.
But German idealism, romanticism, and other movements had
failed to defend their beliefs persuasively, and so intellectuals ,
turned to a scientific, empirical, perhaps even experimental,
intersubjectively verifiable approach to the understanding of
man which was not philosophical, or "religious." As it turned
out, most of the university chairs went to the naturalists and not
to the humanistic psychologists. It was then just a short step
from the toleration of Wundt's introspective method to
intolerance of methods that aren't empirically verifiable. The
whole question of empirical verifiability and positivism is in the
background, and it turns out in this view, that introspection is
just not, by definition, a legitimate method. Because I'm aware
of my mental states, and you're not possibly aware of my mental
states, they are not intersubjectively verifiable. You can't tell if
I'm lying when reporting my mental state, or perhaps mistaken.
And so the whole project of trying to interpret human

experience from the point of view of the subject or from the
inside out, rather than the outside in, is eliminated, because the
methodologies which are compatible with a naturalistic view o_f
men are those which are canonized. Not because they are better,
but because naturalism, and the naturalistic philosophy of man
is what carried the day especially in the Anglo-American world.
So the history of psychology cannot be understood apart from
those sorts of meta-scientific considerations.
Joosse:True, and in light of the unprecedented achievements
then occurring in the natural sciences, it's no_t surprising that
people starting a new discipline said, "Hey, those naturalistic
methods have been highly successful. We would be foolish not
to use them." We can debate whether psychology should have
gotten hooked up with naturalism and those methods, but it is
certainly understandable that it chose to do that.
Lucasse: Do you think that there is a shift away from that
today? Are people trying to "unhook" psychology · from the
natural sciences?
Joosse: 1 think that there is more tension today on that issue
than perhaps anytime in the last hundred years. But, as John
said, it's the naturalist, the empirical science people who are still
very much in control of the discipline; t_hat is the mainstream ..
By no means are we in some sort of revplutionary state, where
it's going to shift to a more phenomenological position. That
might happen in the next twenty or thirty years.
Lucasse:Are there just little pockets of resistance, or is there a
definite minority position?
Joosse: I think little pockets.
.
·
Cooper:1n North America there are little pockets; if you go to
Europe, phenomenology, extentialism, and Marxism have
gained importance as approaches to· psychology-all of which
are humanistic. I would guess that strict naturalists are in the
minority.
VanderGoot:Jn fact, American psychology is gaining prominence in European universities, partly because it seems to be a
counterbalance to what was going on in Europe all the while
that Americans were .doing empirical, naturalistic psychology.
Because there is a disillusionment about the more speculative
psychology in Europe which is not the same sort of disillusionment that you find in North America. In North America the
protests are more than littl~ ripples here or there. The standard
positivistic way of doing psychology is being criticized by persons who are critical of more than just some details. They are
coming with an alternative tradition that has behind it a strong
ideology. I think tha_t Marxist criticisms, for example,
expecially of experimental psychology aren't random pot shots;
they are well-organized and S,Ystematic criticisms which get at
the fundamental assumptions behind the now conventional
aproach. They work from there to ask s<;>me important
questions about whatever happ_ened to values m a supposedly .
objective science, and they criticize the uses to which psychology can be put. That is one example of what may be a
minority position, but a powerful minority position because it
has· coherence. It isn't just criticism; it is an alternative
conceptual framework. So I think, in the future, the debates are
going to make clearer how perspectival the discipline of psychology is. I think that it would be a step in the right direction if ·
we no longer talked about psychology as psychology, but
always talked about kinds of psychology, and are conscious
that psychology is not some common denominator of science,
but psychology is just one expression of ideas which rise out of
their faith commitments. Joosse:we're talking more about some very current trends and
alternatives and corrections. I wonder if we should back up and
talk a little more about mainstream psychology. I suspect Bill
would be less critical than the rest of us of the discipline as we
know it in North America. I wonder if he should take some dme

to define what he takes to be the nature of psychology and to
make a case for that. I suspect that he represents the majority
not only in American psychology but within the psychology
department at Calvin.
Sanderson:1t seems to me, that a lot of what you have all been
saying amounts to a plea that American psychologists. expand
their purview of the discipline to include the study of thmk1~g. I
believe that is what is happening in psychology. There 1s a
·strong movement towards cogn, tive psychology-that is, a
movement toward applying experimental "empirical" principles to studies of cognition and values. So i~ ap_Pea~s to me the
science which·Wundt hoped would blossom m lime mto a fuller
attempt to study man from an objective perspective is indeed
going more and more in that direction. Let me just say one.more
thing. I can't conceive of any science that isn't a natural science.
We are all concerned about the natural world in which we live.
Now if somebody here wants to study an unnatural science, I
agree that we don't know how it's done-something like.
astrology or ....
Lucasse: Might the question be though, whether psychology
should be studied as a science, instead of naturally or unnaturally?
.
Joosse:veah, science-but the opposition should be between
natural science and what some people have called human
science. I think psychology should begin with man in all his
complexity and from there look for methods which will enable
.us to study him as systematically as possible. But it should not
· begin with the methodology and then ask just those questions
which can be asked with the methodology. The cliche' is that the
tail is wagging the dog: methodology is determining what we
study. But with a human science we begin with the important
question and then talk about methodology. So I don't think the
contrast is natural versus unnatural, but natural versus a.
broader rubric-like hu'm an science.
VanderGoot:All -those psychologists who study cognition and
values study the values and cognitive processes of their object,
the subject who. takes part in the experiment. And those persons who suggest that psychology should take seriously the importance of considering values, aren't talking ~bout an
~mpirical study of the object's values, but are talkmg about

"At some point we .have to
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those values, which determine how the discipline is done, the
psychologist's values. To a great extent mainstream psychology
does not comprehend how the study of values pertains to itself
as a discipline. It still prete[Jds to be categorically different from
the person studied. It's a major problem in the discip-Iine that
there is a -lack of self-consciousness about what psychology
studies in human behavior which pertains to the very human behavior of doing science.
Cooper: Part ·o f the problem, going back to the question of
human nature, is what sort of model of man you use to integrate
the data of your findings. And part of the problem in the
naturalistic approach to psychology, as I see it, is that when you
talk about human actions or mental states or things . that
persons feel, models which come out of the natural world are
not appropriate for representing them.
Sanderson:The natural world: to me that is the world you and I
are living in.
Cooper:No, I think that when the scientists that I read distinguish between the natural and the human· world, they mean_by
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"natural world" those things which would be explainable, say,
in terms of the laws of physics and biology.
Sanderson: Unless, when they say natural laws, they mean the
laws which govern the universe.
Cooper: OK; but there are certain kinds of entities which are
totally explainable by physics, like rocks, shall we say, and perhaps certain kinds of organisms, but. ...
Sanderson: There are simple and more complex kinds of
organisms and laws.
Cooper: But the question is whether throughout the world there
1s a basic unidimensionality. Is there just one kind of casual
nexis? Or are there "layers," a reality of "layers" where some of
the higher layers just can't be explained in terms of the lower
layers? If so, then to explain what goes on when a person comes
into a room and perceives a red chair, it just won't do to think of
· that mental act as though it were simply a function of an organic
system or a cybernetic system.
Sanderson: Psychology doesn't purport to explain everything.
It wants to understand a very limited aspect of a situation.
VanderGoot: It seems to me that what you can study represents
more than one kind of phenomenon. For each different phenomenon there should be a different kind of method. Psychology
should be a multi-method discipline.
Sanderson: I think that I agree with that. But, I don't think
psychology should take on more than it can handle. It should
leave something for philosophy or theology. It's not that
psychology is responsible for the whole domain of human
experience.
Cooper: I agree with that. I would also agree that it probably
ought to em ply a plurality of methods and perhaps a plurality of
models. Although, as a philosopher, I'd like to be able to show
the underlying unity or correlativity. I think that it is probably a
good thing to hook back into our discussion about the history
of psychology-for example, the reaction against Marxism and
existentialism in Europe. Likewise, it is a good thing that there
is reaction against the pragmatistic naturalism which dominates
psychology here. Because certainly it is not true that Marxism
or pragmatism, for instance, arise spontaneously out of their
dispassionate, scientific observation of human nature. I don't
intend to suggest that the scientific community ought to jump
off the naturalistic boat and jump onto the existentialist boat,
or anything like that. I think that they both can add something
to an understanding of human nature. To that extent the
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opposition is a good counter-balance. So I would be in favor of
learning fro·m a lot of different kinds of approaches, a
pluralism. But. how do we as Christians get all this straight?
Lucasse: You said that psychology should be limited, how
would you limit it? Would you limit it according to the method? ·
That's what Mary says psychology has done: the method determines what is studied. What's the core that you start with?
Sanderson: Psychology started as the study of sensation and
then grew through studies in perception and learning. It's usual
now to talk about cognition, and that's one current way in
which psychology is continuing to change and to increase the
complexity of the phenomena it undertakes to study. It also
began studying very limited kinds of behavior like reflex action
and gradually expanded to consider more complex areas of
behavior. The method is presumably expandable with respect
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to the multiple aspects of "psychological" phenomena and also
with respect to the increasing extent of human activity which
may be studied .
Lucasse: Do you think psychology should use a different
methodology than physics since one is studying man and the
other nature? Should the object determine the methodology?
Sanderson: In general we have to say that as the object of
psychological study becomes more complex, there is a demand
for wider diversity of method and greater ingenuity in pursuing
the study ....
Joosse: Bill paints an optimistic picture of the discipline
growing more comprehensive, complex, and mature. That's a
nice vision, but I don't see it happening that way. First of all,
there is great resistance to people who would approach the
study of behavior in a different way. You try to get through any
doctoral program without doing an empirical study and you've
got a big problem on your hands. Later you have trouble getting
faculty appointments, tenure, etc. There is a lot of resistance to
people who do think otherwise. Today people are asking
· whether psychology .is locked into some kind of a paradigm that
is going to preclude the kind of growth and expansion that Bill
described. Are there built-in limits to the empirical
methodology?
·
At a recent, psychological conference at St. Louis University
the main theme was an epistemological one. "Has the empirical
business taken us as far as it's going to? Are there built-in
limits?" And I think it's exciting that psychologists are beginning to be troubled. That's happening more and more, and not
only among Christians. For me, this casts doubts on the kind of
progress that Bill would envision down the road.
VanderGoot: Well, as I see it, a very important problem that
comes up is that the traditional approach to psychology and the
method which was originally used for the sciences makes certain kinds of assumptions about the person being studied. For
example, in experimental social psychology, it is almost always
assumed that you can study an individual's behavior best if that
individual doesn't know what you are studying, that somehow.
the posture or the stance of psychologists and the person who is
being studied are entirely different. But it seems to me quite
reasonable to assume that a great deal can be learned by the
psychologist and the person being studied interacting in the
most deliberate and self-conscious way. Rather than having a
psychologist coax some information out of the subject, he
simply asks for it and counts on the essential character of
human communication to derive those observations and understanding. It seems to me that a great deal in psychology can be
learned not by looking to the natural sciences for methods, but
looking to the humanities. A psychologist can be speculative;
you learn a lot about methods by saying, "How does the person
doing literary criticism look at the context, the devices and the
intentions of the author. One of the ways that you understand
the text is by asking what effect it has on the reader? P_sychologists could learn a lot by saying not "what do I see in my
object," but "how does that person affect me?" The psychologist then becomes a kind of sensitive instrument within the
method. Within present methods that would be disal!owed as
highly subjective. But I think that because of the nature of the
object, certain (what would be called) subjective methods are
necessary. I hesitate to call them subjective, because that sounds
as though they are capricious. By subjective I mean
only experimenter, or psychologist-involved methods, but
i:ionetheless carefully made and executed in a disciplined and
controlled fashion. It opens up a lot' of new possibilities. It's not
going to solve all of the problems, but it seems a good start.
Sanderson: Marvellous! Beautiful! But I feel the disciphne 1s
threatened by this kind of word game, this poetry ....
VanderGoot: I don't see why talking about the poetry of human

experience is any less appropriate than talking about the objectivity of human behavior-that treats human beings as though
they were somehow the objects studied by a physicist. The'
methods should be modeled after the object. Psychology should
get serious about what it wants to study, and then be inventive
about the method that is used.
Joosse: Bill, you see more film than I do; you read novels, you
appreciate the arts. Doesn't it trouble you that when one reads
psychology journals and texts, it seems a far more truncated
and amputated version of man comes through. It doesn't
resemble human existence as we. personally experience it. That
is where some of us are troubled: the method doesn't seem to d·o
justice to the complex.ity, the subtlety, the God-given uniqueness of human beings. That doesn't seem to trouble you. I find
that paradoxical-given your awareness and appreciation for
. the artistic attempts t~ explain human behavior.
Sanderson: I appreciate it; I give other disciplines full credit.

Mary VanaerGoot
Psychology is enriched by many other disciplines. But how can
one discipline hope to cover. it all? I want to experience as much
as I can as a total person, but I would be reluctant to say that I
must function as a psychologist per seas I attempt to fit together
psychological and theological ideas. The practical study of
human life must be pursued by many disciplines and many
. human beings, before we try to put some kind of package
together.
·
Joosse: But I see dangers in that kind of compartmentalization.
You hinted at it even in terms of theology. There are a lot of
Christians in psychology who take seriously being a Christian
and take ~eriously being a psychologist-but the two don't
interact very much. Doing psychology is insulated from any
kind of influence from outside of that methodology. And that is
what is disturbing to me. I'm bothered when Christians in
psychology talk as if our primary obligation is •to be a good
scientist. At be.st, that may. be a nominal obligation. Surely
something more unique is called for.
VanderGoot: Are we to believe that science really is empirical?
That doesn't seem to be the case, we are motivated by all sorts of
implicit biases. And in fact, though you may want to compartmentalize psychology from the arts or theology, yet underlying
them all are very subjective things pertaining to you. Why not
make conscious the influences that affect the psychology you do.
Sanderson: Well, we all realize that psychologists can't separate
themselves from all predispositions. It's just you need some·
consistency of approach, and you need to spe.cify your predispositions.

Lucass~: How should one begin to construct a Christian
critique of psychology? Is such an enterprise possible?
Sanderson: I have some problems with the way that question is
worded. Psychology is so diverse it's very difficult to critique
psychology, period. You would have to critique the different
approaches and theories in psychology. I would prefer to ask
something like this: "What particular Christian ideas have
special relevance for the study of psychology?"
Lucasse: The values that one studies?
Sanderson: It seems to me that the study of values is a pretty
sophisticated enterprise for psychology to get into at the present
time. But Mary is talkirig about the values of psychologists
themselves, and that should be a big issue.
Lucasse: How do you think one does Christian psychology, or is
it just a science that one, as a Christian, can do?
Sanderson: That "either/ or" makes it difficult. One of my
fundamental presuppositions is that there is a large element of
common ground b'y virtue of God's common grace, so that
people from enormously different perspectives are perfectly
capable of spelling out important aspects of the one natural
' world that they all confront. It's qu'ite possible to have a science
of psychology which can be shared by people of widely
different backgrounds. And to a limited extent, the question of
Christian psychology can be irrelevant. But that's the point: we
don't have to be Christians to come to reasonable conclusions
about many matters that pertain to psychology or biology ·or
political ·science.
Lucasse: Does it affect the questions you'd have to ask in
psychology?
Sanderso·n: It can. It seems to me there might be questions that
Christians would be particularly interested in; there would be a
common body of questions that all human beings would find
interesting; and there would be questions of peculiar interest to
Buddhists or Mohammedans or. ...
VanderGoot: Marxists.
Cooper: Or Naturalists.
VanderGoot: I have quite a different view on the matter. I don't
accept the notion that there is a "natural world," an .
autonomous structure within which we all live. I think that a
Christian view of science has to begin by acknowledging that all
of creation is God-created. Wl).en we look at the creation and attempt to give some account of it, we are always responding, not
only to part of it, but to all of it. That is, our response to it is a
part of, a detail in, our vision of the whole. The ideas which arise
in a science arise in response to a whole reality. And they either
give adequate accounting, or they do not. And it seems to me •
that a scientist who wishes to eliminate from his total vision the
acknowledgement that the creation is made for us creatures by
-the Creator will have to omit the acknowledgement every step
of the way. And it shows up, for example, in the scientist's definition of the person; it shows up in how he _describes the
scjentific enterprise. Is it mastery and control, or is it stewardship? Is it an enterprise devoted to understanding our place in
the world that God made? So, it seems to me that Christian
psychology should mean two things: Christian psychology
should have a critical apparatus to discern the visions out of
which other perspectives arise; and Christian psychology would
have to have a religious vision of its own, and see the implications of that vision for its approaching or addressing certain
objects to unders.t and them better. So, I don't see the neutral
ground .
Cooper: I'm probably in the middle somewhere. I certainly
agree with Bill that there is common grace. And I do think that,
Christian or non-Christian, we can know certain things: that
Lansing is the capital of Michigan, or that .certain brain
processes are necessary for certain kinds of conscious functions. We can get these facts down. I suspect, though, that if
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we've stacked up all the facts that Marxists, Humanists,
Naturalists, and Christians might agree on, we wouldn't have
enough for a complete science of psychology. We might agree
on certain low leve'I theories, but a science is a good deal more
than that; it also includes high level theories, and organizing
principles, or presuppositions of some sort. So, when you look
at how different individuals from the different basic perspectives actually elaborate their whole systems of psychology, they
shade off in different directions, even though they may agree on
some of the same facts. So I do think that there are facts, but our
apprehending facts is a very complex thing, because there are
not just brute facts, facts the lie out there like stones. They're all
interconnected and interwoven, more like a rope than like
stones lying on the ground. Second, there's a complication in
the fact that we, as individuals, are very complex and all sorts of
things go on when we start picking out the facts. Whe.n people
sta'rt disentangling, to find out what the facts are, they bring
with them not only religious commitments and value
commitments, but all sorts of conditions of interest, training,
preformed concepts, language-even whether they. had a
headache or not, on a certain day-all this is going to somehow
play a role in whether they get the facts or not and which ones
they pick out. If you put these complexities together, I don't
think that there are objective sciences . in the old-fashioned
sense. Metaphysically there are facts, but epistemologically, it's
an extremely tough thing to get them all down according to
standards of objectivity. And I doubt that science simply begins from collected facts. So, I agree with Bill in one way and
Mary in another. But I do think the question of a Christian
approach to psychology is an important one; it's not simply attaching Christianity onto some organized, systematized, relatively comprehensive body of knowledge accepted by a number
of individuals from a number of different basic perspectives: the
agreed-on areas are relatively minor compared to the nonagreed upon areas.
v
VanderGoot: I should say that when I suggested there's no
common ground, I was not suggesting Christian psychology
should ignore everyone else. I think that every psychologist is
responsible to know as much as possible about what other
psychologists do, but I also think we only learn from what
others do when we see it in the context of the vision that
motivates them. Therefore, I don't see trying to sort the facts
out of someone else's theory as the most adequate way of
approach. It's far more profitable to try to understand someone's theory in a larger context that helps us to understand the
coherence of that person's vision for life, of that person's
understanding of the enterprise ·of psychology. The way we
learn from each other is not on the level of fact, but it's really on
the most wholistic and inclusive level of understanding.
Sanderson: A lot of things that Mary said I like a lot. But I think
that an adequate understanding of the Bible or Christian
theology suggests a very wide range of common ground. And it
seems to me that I'm being quite Christian when I proceed on
the basis of a wide range of common ground. The gospel itself is
declared on the basis of the common ground when it says that
which we have seen and heard, that which our hands 9ave
handled of the Word of life, that's what we declare. We declare
our witness of the events which we have seen and heard and
touched. Christianity is an empirical religion; it encourages the
understanding of the world as .it actually is before us. And I don't
think that just little isolated facts are out there. I think that the
organization of the facts is likewise there and can be discerned
using the minds that God has given us. I'm not just picking up
little pebbles of facts off the sand; I'm looking at a lawful
universe. The Bible tells me it's lawful. And other people
together are also searching for the laws. Some who search for
the laws don't believe that there is a creator who imbued the
universe with these laws, but they're still looking for laws; and
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when they find them, they turn out to be pretty good.
VanderGoot: We, by our actions, make possible or imposstble,
other future action.
Sanderson: And we who make it possible are, ourselves, the

John Cooper and Wayne Joosse

product of the ongoing lawfulnesses.
VanderGoot: Right, but it's not as if the psychologist's study of
human behavior is always separate from the object. In fact, the
psychologist's study of human behavior forms the objects and,
when he or she comes to them again, the psychologist sees the
impact of his or her earlier formation. And that's why any
notion of objectivity becomes preposterous, because our
science has shaped its object. The twentieth century person is
not like the nineteenth century person, in part, because of the
existence of the science of psychology.
Sanderson: That's why you have to study both the nineteenth
century person and the twentieth century person. All it seems to
me you're saying is the job is more complicated and difficult
than someone might have thought originally.
VanderGoot: But then I think you can't look at that objectand
try to describe it at this moment in time without saying if what
has happened to it is a good thing or not.
Sanderson: Well, you could, if you were just trying to decide
what has happened. Then you should have another science to
say whether that was a good thing.
VanderGoot: But, we are not just describing what has
happened. We are describing what we have caused to happen
and what we will cause to happen, and therefore we have to
make judgments about whether the forming of our
consciousness via psychology is good and right and
appropriate.
Lucasse: Mary, would you say that it's not right to, do psychology by just studying humans and describing what we see,
but we have to take responsibility for being part of their
formation?
VanderGoot: Not only that I'm responsible for the object that
I've studied, but the psychologist is responsible for the formation of a cultural consciousness which becomes part of 'the
individual's. If one pretends to be objective or tries to approach
psychology objectively, one is not completely honest, not taking
responsibility for what it means to study people.
Joosse: But I think it's becoming increasingly evident to people
today that science is not as neutral, value-free and as objective
as it's been presented. There's presuppositions; there's faith
statements; there's biases that enter m anct <11stort even what
questions are asked, what data is admissable. Science people
have been kind of smug, you know. "We're on the side of objectivity; why do you want to go into these subjective swamps. We
have these self-correcting systems." You know in grad school it
was like an epistemological arrogance-they never even asked
these questions. It was like, "of course, any sane modern man
knows that this is the way you do business, that these are the
facts." Now that position is under attack, and Christians are
-feeling free to pursue psychology in a different way than non-

Christians. What's Dooyeweerd's phrase?-Everyone makes
faith statements-that all assertions emanate from a "religious"
position? Christians are less intimidated by some of these traditional all-power-to-empiricism arguments.
Now I'd like to ask John if he would clarify something. If I
heard you right, you believe in some 'kind of metaphysical
objectivity, but that epistemologically things are more subjective, that-going a little beyond what you said-knowing is a
very personal thing. Bill feels his apprnach is very biblical, but
another theme in scripture is that certain things are discernable
only to the believer, through the spectacles of faith, that the fear
of God is the beginning of wisdom. All that would suggest that
this common ground which gives Bill so much confidence may
be less broad, and that, epistomologically, Christians ought to
be going about this business of psychology in a very different
way.
Cooper: Yeah, I think that's right. But there is also a danger
here. Sometimes when we talk about differences in faith
commitments, we tend to . fall into idealistic or subjective
language which is prone to hold that once you determine a heart
commitment, everything else in a system of beliefs follows from
it. I think that's overly simplistic. Furthermore, I don't think
that most_people who talk that way mean to be idealistic or
subjectivistic. I certainly do not. I don't want to deny a
metaphysically objective world. There is one way things are.
Maybe there are dimensions ofreality, say in subjectivity, which
are inherently ambiguous, but then that's how things are.
Yet the epistemological situation is extremely complex. For
one reason, we are not infinite knowers. For another, althoµgh
we are all creatures who do exist in God's world, and although
the truth is there for us, we suppress it in unrighteousness.
Metaphysically, sure, there's common ground. There is one
creation order; all men live in terms of it. But it's not so clear
that the message of Scripture about creation is that obvious to
everybody.
Sanderson: What are we talking about that is "obvious" or
"not obvious"? Many .matters pertaining to one's relationship to
God in the way of salvation are spiritually discerned. I'm not

"Psychology continues to
ask the basic question of
Socrates, 'What is man?' "
saying that they are part of the common ground. Yet, it's part of
the common ground that Christ died and rose from the dead.
That's a fact o'f history, though not everyone is going to believe
. it. And, of course, there are higher levels of faith commitments
that don't enter into the broad realm of common ground ....
Cooper: The latter point is where I disagree. In Romans 2 there
is some indication that the law is in the hearts of unbelievers.
And Romans 1 talks about the creation of God's power and
divinity being evident to unbelievers as well. But they suppress it
in unrighteousness. Now it doesn't say that there are some
higher level things which prevent them from seeing some lower
level things. But, in fact, what unregenerate people do is refuse .
to worship the creator and instead worship some creature. That
sort of worship phenomenon also sho·ws up in scientific studies.
Because of its nature, science has to be elaborated in terms of
some high level theories that involve presuppositions, some
basic beliefs which function as control beliefs within science . .
There's always something like what Dooyeweerd calls "absolutization" there. It is part of human nature that if the God who
transcends the creation is not worshipped or acknowledged as
the starting point, then some other thing will have to be. And insofar as the center of gravity is placed in that other thing, the

whole perspective from which reality is articulated will also be
pushed off-center: it's out of focus. That ties into what Mary
wa.s saying before. I don't think it's just that non-Christians
don't believe in Jesus for some high level reason but on a low
level they get everything right. I think the two levels are
organically or systematically bound together.

"/ think psychology 'violates
the person' to understand a
certain aspect of his total
life."
Sanderson: Let's say you listen to Carl Sagan on television. It's
off center, isn't it? But the data of astronony-would it be any
different for Christians? I think it is off center because he puts
all of his emphasis upon naturalistic forces and the process of
cha·nce evolution. But, ·with respect to the actual observation
and the best possible contemporary theories about astronomy, I
doubt there would be much difference between Christian and
non-Christian astronomers, but I just sort of laugh when he
makes those extremes extrapolations from his data.
VanderGoot: It's more than extrapolation from the data. You
have to remember that we're talking about human behavior. I
don't think that we can talk as if there is a static structure of
natural laws which govern human behavior; what we're talking
. about is an orderly creation; one aspect of that orderliness is
that we can affect it by our behavior and that we, by our behavior, not only form the possibilities for our own actions but
we shape the environment in which we act. It's especially true of
the psychologist that he or she doesn't just observe an orderly
structure of acts as if he or she is a spectator; the psychologist,
es'pecially in the twentieth ce)!tury, is ·often studying the very
product-the consequences-of someone's having done
psychology earlier. Since the time of Freud, for example,
human self-conscious has changed. So psychology is a
historical science; and we can't pretend that there's some
objective set of laws operating out there and we look at events
and try to ascertain those laws. We're talking about a reality of
quite a different character.
Sanderson: Actually, I haven't been able to conceptualize what
the different character is. Is is that it's historical? It seems
to me the events of history are merely the outworking of the
lawful creation of God.
VanderGoot: ·No, I think the difference is that, as a psychologist I have the possibility of shaping my future objects by my
present investigation.
Sanders~~: But only in the context of natural law.
VanderGoot: Well, I think natural law is not a very adequate
term in this case, because ....
Sanderson: Well, what would be a better word for it?
VanderGoot: I think we're talking about an orderly creation
whose orderliness i_ncludes the possibility of formation, so that
we shape the structures which ....
Sanderson: What do you mean by formation?
Joosse: I would like to go back to the discussion of Sagan and
his TV show. I was surprised at your response, Bill. You said
Sagan . is off-center because of his extreme emphasis on
naturalism, and you laugh it off as he extrapolates from that.
And yet earlier, when we were talking about human beings as an
object of study, ym~ were quite comfortable with people who
wanted to deal with naturalism and naturalistic explanations,
natural law. "It's a natural world," you said. "Isn't it?" as if
naturalism were quite adequate to a study of human beings, but
inadequate to study the behavior of celestial b~ings. In space
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you see supernatural factors that naturalism can't account for.
But you don't have the same problem with studying human
beings. I would question whether natural man is the same as
human man.
Sanderson: If you are asking "in what way is man more than a
natural phenomenon" you have raised a philosophical issue
which is terribly important to me. If someone were to extrapolate from. human behavior in the same way that Sagan does
fr.o m the formation of the universe, I would say that is absurd
also. Skinner is absurd when he extrapolates like that.
Joosse: But then we are back to definitions. You define
psychology as a natural science, and say you see some of these
same important questions but you send them over to the philosophers. If you begin with a definition about understanding
persons and human beings, then those questions are not out of
bounds to psychology but very appropriate.
Sanderson: It depends on what you are trying to understand.
Joosse: The behavior of human persons.
Sanderson: Certain aspects of persons, not the totality of them.
Persons have to be studied from the point of view of poetry, and
philosophy_ and religion as well.
Joosse: Well, I'm not as willing to define the domain in terms of
methodology. But even with your definition, it seems you would
have some problems; for example, 'political scientists
empirically study behavior. I wonder if any of us have a definition that doesn't get us into that haziness.
Sanderson: I don't think that it's ever going to be clearly defined. There haven't been any final resolutions to these questions arising from psychology. It's necessary to realize that we
have to give over parts of our investigative efforts to another
aspect of human thought.
Joosse: But hasn't the discipline done some violence to the
human person when it wants to yank out certain dimensions
and study them in isolation. The question is whether that
violates the person, you have to preserve the person.
Sanderson: l think psychology "violates the person" to understand a certain aspect of his total life.
Joosse: This may be our key difference-the merits versus
dangers of scientific reductionism. Does it preclude true understanding of human beings and result in an illusion of
understanding? Psychologists want to produce all these
empirical bricks, believing that some day they will add up to
a big house; well, maybe somehow the whole is more than just
the sum of all the reductionistic parts.
VanderGoot: I don't think that even describes what happens.
Some set aside the important questions and go about studying a
specialized discipline. But people in psychology who have
established the major trends are people who have responded to
very fundamental questions. They have developed a psychology
by considering important philqsphical questions. Persons who
don't do that just piggy-back. They join into a tradition where
the questions have already been answered, and they accept these
answers. But, at the forefront of each major tradition in
psychology was a person who knew very well philosophically
why psychology was developing in a certain direction.
Lucasse: Could you point out the differences that occur within
Calvin's psychology department? Is it different from a secular
university? Should there be a difference?
Sanderson: I think there certainly should. That's why my
courses begin with a discussion about the image of God; I try to
show students that what we do in this course is perfectly
compatible with the scriptural view of what it means to be
created in God's image. But I treat the material of the course in a
careful attempt to state the theories of the individuals we're ·
studying. In each case, I try to show them how to trace back to
the concept of the image of God. In the history of psychology I
attempt to get as full a picture as possible of what has actually
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occurred-always with an eye to the possibilities of approaching an understanding of it in a Christian perspective ..
V~nderGoot: Well my approach in teaching psychology is to

William Sanderson

introduce basic perspectives, because each type of psychology
depends on a different definition of the person. I attempt to set
up a conc;eptual framework so that when I go on to introduce
specific kinds of research activities or special theories within
psychology I try to place this psychologist's work within a
broader perspective. Rather than informing the students about
the discipline of psychology factually, I put the emphasis in
training my students to sense a psychologist's point of view.
Joosse: Well I think we haven't responded to Mary's question
about differences between Calvin and secular universities.
Some people think that the primary Christian responsibility is
to be a good scientist, an honest scientist. The problem with that
view is that being a Christian and a psychologist becomes
basically two separate domains. Other people have a more
extrinsic approach: you first master the discipline and then you
say as a Christian, "What do I make of this?" What do I want to
add?" "What do I have to disagree with?" Still others think that
you can't just bring God in at the end and somehow patch things
together-that it should be more intrinsic, more foundational;
you've got to build the whole discipline on different presuppositions. Those three positions are the cause, in some sense, of
tension in our department and other departments as well.
Fortunately, Christians have been talking about the issues more
in the last five or six years than ever before. Unfortunately
though, the view that seems dominant is one that emphasizes
the levels of explanation. You've seen Mackay's book arou.nd
campus, The Clockwork Image. His view emphasizes levels of
explanation-the same phenomenon can be explained on many
different levels: the chemist does it one way, the biologist
another, Skinner another, theologians at another level. You
don't have to choose; they're not in conflict with one another.
Now, that's a persuasive approach, and many are attracted to it.
But I'm skeptical and rather regret that so many are grabbing on
to that view. I suspect that it's just a little too easy-this level of
analysis. It solves too many tough problems too easily. There
are rigorous philosophical criteria which "complimentary
explanations" need to meet. And most of the time we're too
easily satisfied with these neat little metaphors about a poem
being a little blop of ink on paper and on another level you can
see them as letters, another level as words, and the words have
meaning. There's just something slippery about that, but I'm
afraid it's going to take somebody sharper than me to sort that
argument out. But anyway, that is the dominant resolution for
these tensions. Most of the Christians in psychology that I know
have jumped at that and it has somehow taken the tension off. I
think five years ago there was a lot of regret that Mackay and

others like him, for all their good intentions, have reduced that
dissonance. I'm not so sure that we're better off.
Cooper:I have the same uneasiness. i°think it's slippery because
people suppose that by speaking about different "viewpoints"
they can avoid tough metaphysical issues. They think we don't
have to take a stand on what a human being is, or whether there
are irreducibly mental acts, or whether we are metaphysically
free agents in order to do psychology. They say, "Well, from this
viewpoint it looks as though we can give an exhaustive account
.of brain events in terms of biological mechanisms." But if the
biologist can do the latter, then either we are not free in any of
our mental acts or otherwise the mind is not ·just the brain
looked at from a different "viewpoint" or else perhaps brain
physicology is just an intellectual construct. ·1 don't think
psychologists can avoid metaphysics. But this
"perspectivalism" or "complementarism" is often an attempt to
dojust that. Mackay is a classic case of someone whose views do
have some highly questionable metaphysical implications. On
the other hand, if one is willing to face the philosophical issues, I '
think a plurality of methods and approaches is appropriate for
psychology.
,
Joosse: One obvious problem is that some of those so-called
complimentary explanations begin with diametrically opposed •
presuppositions. Bill has called Skinner's work splendid at different times, but Skinner's though is based on an absolutely
different view of man than the biblical account of man as free
and responsible to God. How can all these levels of explanation
happily .coexist when they begin with dramatically opposed
presuppositions?
VanderGoot:There's another challenge that Christian psychologists should face. Not only to·consider psychology in terms of
its object, and methods appropriate for studying this object, but
psychology now has to develop some ·ways of looking at the
accumulated testimonies of what's been done in its disciplines.
We have to look at the texts of our discipline. And that's where
we're weakest. We really don't know how to look at them in a
thorough and cumulative way.
Joosse:Hermeneutical questions are foundational to a lot of the .
things we've been talking about.
.
Sanderson: J suppose that anybody in our department would
say that you've simply got to have a Christian hermeneutic to
begin to put together the results of many sciences, so that these
many levels of inquiry will- have to be fitted together; and
probably can be fitted together in many different ways within _
the Christian perspective.
Joosse: There is a peculiar phenomenon. Psychology is increasingly under attack, but primarily from Christians outside
of the discipline. They see the problems and the conflict while
many of the Christians within the disciplines feel comfortable
with the methodologies and content they've been taught.
Sanderson:! don't know that that's true. You'd have to get very
specific,. I guess.
.
Joosse:But I think that generalization is accurate, we talk about
those matters very little in our department whereas Christians
who are not psychologists frequently bring them up. You get all
these left-hap.ded compliments. I got a letter the other day from
somebody saying, "You know, J oosse, you're not bad for being
a psychologist." That happens time and again. Christian academics in other disciplines have great suspicions of psychology.
They believe we are altogether too uncritical of the discipline
and oblivious to crucial issues.
Lucasse: Why is that?
Joosse:Well, I don't .know. You could argue that the psychologists understand the .discipline better than tpese outsiders.
Maybe the problem is with the critics. The other possibility is
that the critics see something in the discipline that those of us
who are products of secular graduate schools have trouble

seeing; we're so locked into a certain paradigm that we can only
see things in a certain way. Conse.quently, many of my
colleagues feel picked on. Who is right? I suppose an ·virtue
and/ or blame is not all on one side.
Sanderson:! think that psychologists react againstatotal misunderstanding some of these people have about psychology. I
defend Skinner because of the inadequate way other people
think about him. So I say Skinner does splendid work because ,
you can take his principles and help autistic children learn to
talk. And when I see some of these people going, "Tsk, tsk, tsk,
how nasty; he treats them as though they were machines." I
wonder would they rather have the kids banging their heads
against the wall? Sometimes we are forced to defend what seems
like a mechanistic view-simply to make the point that there is
a certain validity in what's going on.

VanderGoot: Nobody criticizes Skinner for teaching autistic
children how to talk. What they criticize is generalizing his
theory from autistic children to normal children.
Sanderson:No, some people complain about treating autistic
children like machines, and they just click their tongues about
that.
Cooper: Well, I've heard people angry about Skinner treating
his .own daughte,r like a machine.
.
·
VanderGoot: When people think about Skin.ner they don't
think, '.' Oh, yes, Skinner: teaching autistic children to talk."
They think, "Oh, yes, Skinner: Beyond Freedom and
Dignity." They think of his philosophical and anthropological
underpinning. And I think he is responsible for that just as
much as he is for his ·advanced methods.
.
Sanderson:! think some of Skinner's positions are polemical or
extreme to make a point.
·
Joosse: In summary, I think the problem with scientism in
psychology is that it star~s out by excluding certain things and
says, "Hey, we can't address those questions, they're not
amendable to scientific technology." After a little while it's no
longer that we can't deal with those things, but that they are not
very important, because they never show up-forgetting that
they can't show up because they ate excluded to begin with. And
after a while, "not very important" becomes "those things no
longer exist." They are not real. The only things which are real
are those which show up empirically and that's the only thing
you can call truth, or factual or statistical. And Skinner illustrates that, and· it's extricably connected with so many of the
issues we've been talking about today. And that's a slippery side
that Christian psychologists have to watch for; the glorification of scientism in the world outside.
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